working papers
Do More Disaggregated Electoral Results Deter Aggregation Fraud? (with Miguel Rueda, Shuning Ge).
R&R at British Journal of Political Science.
Abstract
It has been argued that the level at which electoral results are published can affect the election integrity. Publishing more granular results (e.g., at the polling station level) can allow citizens to verify the vote totals that determine election outcomes, thereby deterring voting aggregation fraud. While this logic undergirds the recommendations of international organizations monitoring elections to publish disaggregated electoral results, to date there have not been systematic assessments of how variation in aggregation is linked to electoral miscounting. We address this lacuna by constructing a new dataset of the level at which electoral results are reported in 125 low- and middle-income countries since 2000. We find a clear negative association between the granularity of published electoral results and perceptions of counting irregularities. We do not observe substitution of election malpractice: increased granularity is not linked to perceptions of other forms of manipulation like electoral violence, opposition harassment, or clientelism.Calculation and Conscience: Motivations for the Substantive Representation of Ethnic Minorities. (with Apurav Bhatiya, William Dinneen, Stephanie Zonszein).
Abstract
A vast body of work shows that ethnic and racial minority legislators are more likely to represent their group’s interests compared to dominant group legislators. However, it is unclear whether this is due to intrinsic motivation or electoral incentives. We argue that previous research designs cannot answer this question. Conversely, we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to analyze the increase in minority representation in the UK Parliament after 2010. By comparing white MPs who narrowly beat minority candidates to minority MPs who narrowly beat white candidates, the RDD controls for electoral incentives since it holds constant constituency factors correlated with a minority parliamentary win. Analyzing over 1 million parliamentary speeches and questions, we find that minority MPs are more likely than white MPs to discuss issues important to ethnic minorities. Our findings suggest that minority substantive representation is likely driven, at least in part, by minority MPs’ intrinsic motivation.The Evolving Landscape of Political Science: Two Decades of Scholarship in a Growing Discipline. (with William Dinneen and Carolina Torreblanca).
Abstract
This study analyzes the evolution of political science (PS) scholarship using 140,000+ articles from 174 journals (2003–2023). We examine how structural changes—shrinking job markets and increased reliance on publication metrics—affect what gets studiedand how. Growing publication pressures push younger scholars to publish more, yet the tripling of PS publication volume stems from a larger contributor base, not individual output. On a positive note, structural shifts have made PS more collaborative, with efficiency gains from team research outweighing credit diffusion. Contrary to fears of topical narrowing, our text-as-data analysis shows consistent topical diversity, though higher-ranked journals form a distinct ecosystem with unique methodological references. We also identify a key tradeoff: topically novel work tends to earn more citations over time but faces hurdles in prestigious journal publication. These findings enhance our understanding of how academic production systems shape the nature ofintellectual progress in the discipline.Ethical Oversight in Impact Evaluations: External Advisory Committees to Assess Programming Risks. (with Darin Christensen, Allison N. Grossman, Jon Kurtz, Jeremey Weinstein, and Jessica Wolff).
Abstract
Social scientists not only conduct impact evaluations but also participate in the design and implementation of the programs being evaluated. While Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) oversee research activities, they do not assess risks posed by the interventions themselves. We propose establishing External Advisory Committees (EACs) to provide independent, expert oversight of programming risks. EACs complement IRBs by focusing on potential harms to participants and communities, offering dynamic risk assessments, and advising on program adaptations or termination. By providing impartial expertise, EACs help address potential conflicts of interest that may arise when researchers and implementers are invested in a program’s continuation. We illustrate the value of EACs through our experience implementing a cross-border labor migration program in Niger. Our EAC provided crucial guidance on scaling up the intervention after a pilot study and adapting the program following an unexpected military coup. While EACs introduce additional costs and may limit researcher autonomy, they generate accountability and are particularly valuable for novel and politically sensitive interventions in fragile environments.The Effects of Cellphone Coverage Expansion on Wealth and Political Behavior. (with Katrina Kosec, Shuning Ge, Apoorva Lal, and Benjamin Laughlin).
Abstract
Taking advantage of Ghana’s gradual extension of cellphone towers in theearly 2000s, we analyze the wealth effects of cellphone coverage expansion ina developing country setting using a difference-in-differences (event study)research design. We proxy local wealth using night-time light density over 1996–2016 and an asset ownership-based index from the 2000 and 2010 censuses. We find that cellphone coverage expansion significantly raised wealthin Ghana. We then explore possible downstream effects of cellphone coverage expansion on electoral outcomes. We find no evidence that better-off citizens reward incumbents, either in presidential or parliamentary elections. Using Afrobarometer survey data, this null finding appears to be be-cause citizens do not give the government credit for economic improvements that are due to decisions made by private telecommunications companies. Further, increases in cellphone coverage significantly decrease vote-buying, which may be due to voters being harder to buy off when they are better off.Can Community Policing Improve Police - Community Relations in an Authoritarian Regime? (with Rob Blair, Anna Wilke).