Supplementary Information

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A Research Design and Data

A.1 Research Design and Data

The data captures performance of a sample of subnational politicians in Uganda (councilors) who are elected to serve at the district level; the higher subnational government entity. In this paper, we use data from up to 50 (out of 112) districts. Figure 1 maps the study area districts.



Figure 1: Study Area

Depending on the data source used, some analysis is based on smaller samples. For example, the scorecard is created by a ACODE, a Ugandan civil society organization (CSO). ACODE was operating in 25 districts (dark shaded districts on the map in Figure 1). The school grant application activity was conducted in 20 ACODE districts as part of a different study. To increase our sample size for the present study, we further matched the "ACODE" districts with 25 similar districts that had not been part of the CSO's scorecard program (medium shaded districts on the map in Figure 1). We conducted in-person surveys of councilors from all 50 matched districts, and collected council meeting minutes in 49 of those districts.[1]

In Table 1 we report the number of councilors for which we have data on, for each data source. For the purpose of the empirical analysis, we use the set of councilors for which we have both performance information (e.g., council meetings or scorecard data) *and* demographic data as derived from the in-person survey.

[1] As mentioned in the main text, one district (Nebbi) did not provide the team with meeting minutes.

Data source	Original sample size	N. districts	Notes
Politician survey 1 (2012)	396	20	Response Rate 98%
Politician survey 2 (2015)	374	20	Response Rate 93%
Politician survey 3 (2016)	943	50	Includes 25 ACODE & 25 matched districts Response Rate 94%
School grant application	395	20	
ACODE Scorecard data	514	25	Includes original 20 districts
Council meeting minutes	820	49	1 refusal district from original 20

Table 1: Sample Size Politicians - Different datasets

A.2 District Matching

ACODE selected program districts such to achieve diversity in region, levels of development, and age of district, following the creation of many new districts after 1995. We use matching to identify non-ACODE districts to serve as plausible counterfactuals for ACODE districts. We match on districts' (a) age; i.e., years since district creation, and (b) number of sub-counties. We also use two variables to proxy development: (c) distance to Kampala, and (d) night-light density. Finally, we match on (e) region, using four indicators for North, Western, Central and Eastern Uganda.

Table 2 provides balance statistics, comparing 25 ACODE districts with 81 Non-ACODE potential matches. We use a flexible optimal full matching algorithm—using the *optmatch R* package, matching on the propensity score, two calipers (for both the propensity score and Mahalanobis distance), while also restricting to exact matching of regions.[2] In Table 3 we provide balance statistics of the resulting matched sample, and in Figure 1 we present a map of the matched districts.

[2]Following Rosenbaum (2012), our matching algorithm penalizing non-exact matches.

	ACODE Mean	Non-ACODE Mean	SD Diff	SD Diff pooled	Variance Ratio	T p-value T	KS p-value	QQ Mean Diff	QQ Med Diff	QQ Max Diff
num_subc	12.36	11.65	14.36	13.45	0.78	0.55	0.20	0.07	0.06	0.21
age	27.40	14.10	114.48	119.43	1.19	0.00	0.00	0.36	0.37	0.52
Kampala Dist	223.88	206.99	17.53	18.27	1.19	0.44	0.18	0.10	0.11	0.24
Light Density	0.21	0.04	40.16	55.25	17.52	0.06	0.00	0.22	0.21	0.35
region_1	0.12	0.23	-34.54	-30.00	0.60	0.17		0.06	0.06	0.12
region_2	0.28	0.31	-6.25	-6.21	0.97	0.79		0.01	0.01	0.03
region_3	0.32	0.23	17.94	18.90	1.25	0.43		0.04	0.04	0.09
region_4	0.28	0.22	12.61	13.17	1.20	0.58		0.03	0.03	0.06
N	25	81								

Table 2: Balance (pre-matching)

	ACODE Mean	Non-ACODE Mean	SD Diff	SD Diff pooled	Variance Ratio	T p-value T	KS p-value	QQ Mean Diff	QQ Med Diff	QQ Max Diff
num_subc	12.36	13.88	-30.93	-26.73	0.60	0.35	0.79	0.07	0.08	0.16
age	27.40	24.32	26.51	25.86	0.91	0.36	0.54	0.07	0.04	0.16
Kampala Dist	223.88	241.52	-18.30	-19.10	1.20	0.50	0.66	0.07	0.08	0.20
Light Density	0.21	0.06	34.70	47.81	18.65	0.10	0.45	0.12	0.12	0.20
region_1	0.12	0.12	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
region_2	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
region_3	0.32	0.32	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
region_4	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
N	25	25								

Table 3: Balance (post-matching)

A.3 District Council Meetings Minutes

In late 2015, we collected plenary council meeting minutes from district government headquarters for the study period (2011-2015). Research team visited all the districts in the sample and scanned the physical copies of the meeting minutes, which were later coded into datasets used later for analysis. The research team hired a local company, based in Kampala, to enter the DCM minutes scans in a way that would allow capturing outcomes of interest.

The company held a 3-day training sessions in cooperation with IPA. At the end of the training, job candidates took an exam prepared by IPA and the PIs, and the company hired the best performing coders. The company used 18 politician-level coders, 5 district-level coders, and 2 back-checkers. Coding activities commenced in Jun-2016 and ended in Aug-2016. Coders first read the minutes and marked every remark or comment; they then used SurveyCTO program to code the scan copies. Back-check was conducted on a randomly selected sample of 10% of meeting minutes. Back-checkers went over the work of the coders and corrected mistakes when necessary. For those coders who made frequent mistakes, 1-day re-training was provided. While the company completed 90% of the work, a contractual difficulty with the company led IPA to take over the remaining work in-house. This did not affect the quality of coding data. IPA held 3-day training sessions with the identical training materials and adhered to the previously established coding and back-check process. The last phase of the coding began in Oct-2016 and ended in Nov-2016. Upon completion of the coding work, the research team combined the data from the coding company and

IPA into a complete dataset.

This dataset contains information on the meetings, including the councilors that were present and the activities they performed in the meetings: passing bills, raising motions, making remarks and presenting. Each is also coded by topic, i.e. health, education, transport. For the purpose of the study we sum up the actions by politician, throughout the electoral period, and we normalize it by the number of meetings in held in the district. The number of meetings in each electoral period varies from district to district. In Figure 2 we plot the average number of politician meetings per year in the period 2008-2015 for each district in our sample. This number varies from 1 meeting in Bushenyi to almost 8 in Moroto. In Table 4–7, we present the summary statistics of the average actions per meeting in the electoral period by sample.



Figure 2: Average annual number of Council Meeting Minutes by district over the study period.

Regular politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**Observt**
Total Actions	2.05	2.17	0.05	16.6	488
Motions	0.83	1.02	0	8.6	488
Bills	0.01	0.04	0	0.29	488
Presentation	0.14	0.24	0	1.88	488
Remarks	1.07	1.32	0	7.17	488
RS-Women politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**Observt**
Total Actions	1.2	1.3	0.05	7	332
Motions	0.65	0.76	0	4.11	332
Bills	0	0.02	0	0.25	332
Presentations	0.09	0.2	0	1.44	332
Remarks	0.45	0.67	0	4.33	332

Table 4: Summary statistics: District Council Meeting Minutes

Regular politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Total Actions	2.13	2.42	0	16.6	488
Motions	0.87	1.21	0	13	488
Bills	0.01	0.04	0	0.31	488
Presentations	0.14	0.25	0	2.03	488
Remarks	1.1	1.45	0	8.58	488
Share meetings attended	0.86	0.25	0	1	488
RS-Women politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Total Actions	1.27	1.43	0	9.33	332
Motions	0.68	0.83	0	5	332
Bills	0.01	0.03	0	0.28	332
Presentations	0.09	0.21	0	1.69	332
Remarks	0.48	0.74	0	4.88	332
Share meetings attended	0.87	0.22	0	1	332

Table 5: Summary statistics: District Council Meeting Minutes weighted by share of meetings attended by politician

Regular politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Total Actions	2.48	2.45	0.05	16.6	154
Motions	0.97	1.15	0	8.6	154
Bills	0.01	0.05	0	0.25	154
Presentations	0.18	0.29	0	1.88	154
Remarks	1.31	1.5	0	7	154
RS-Women politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Total Actions	1.46	1.32	0.06	7	120
Motions	0.78	0.83	0	3.75	120
Bills	0.01	0.02	0	0.08	120
Presentations	0.15	0.25	0	1.44	120
Remarks	0.54	0.66	0	3	120

Table 6: Summary statistics: Regular Councilors - Sample 25 districts

Regular politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Total Actions	2.67	2.64	0	16.6	154
Motions	1.03	1.2	0	8.6	154
Bills	0.02	0.05	0	0.27	154
Presentations	0.2	0.31	0	2.03	154
Remarks	1.43	1.7	0	8.58	154
Share meetings attended	0.87	0.21	0	1	154
RS-Women politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Total Actions	1.57	1.5	0	9.33	120
Motions	0.83	0.94	0	5	120
Bills	0.01	0.02	0	0.09	120
Presentations	0.15	0.28	0	1.69	120
Remarks	0.58	0.72	0	3.33	120
Share meetings attended	0.88	0.2	0	1	120

Table 7: Summary statistics: District Council Meeting Minutes weighted by share of meetings attended by politician - Sample 25 districts

A.4 Scorecard Methodology

ACODE's methodology for collecting data on politicians' performance includes several steps. First, ACODE engages in document review of service delivery and infrastructure reports, budgets, planning documents, minutes of district councils and their committees and other relevant documents. Second, ACODE researchers conduct interviews with politicians — and subsequently any assertions made by politicians are followed up with written evidence. Third, field visits are conducted at service delivery units (e.g. schools, clinics). Fourth, ACODE facilitates focus group discussions with citizens at the sub-county level with a sampling methodology that seeks gender-parity of community leaders, as well as representation of 'ordinary' citizens and youth. Last, interviews with technical staff in the bureaucracy are conducted at both the district and sub-county levels. These include, for example, interviews with the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) heading the district bureaucracy, and heads of departments. Participants give informed consent and participation is voluntary.

The politician scorecard is divided into four components with a set of indicators for each, as depicted in Figure 3).

Each indicator is assigned a score, awarded with a threshold approach. This means that a politician who, for example, has pushed forward more motions in plenary sessions than the designated threshold, receives the same number of points as another politician who has only just met the threshold. One disadvantage of this method is that score-conscious politicians do not have a strong incentive to exert further effort once an indicator threshold is reached. However, there are also advantages to this scoring system. For one, politicians have different sized constituencies, and politicians with larger constituencies (especially RS-women councilors) are not disadvantaged. Another advantage is that it is arguably the easiest type of scoring system for Ugandan politicians and citizens to comprehend. All indicators sum up to a maximum possible

PARAMETER/INDICATOR	Actual Score	Maximum Score
1. LEGISLATIVE ROLE		**25**
i) Participation in plenary sessions		8
ii) Participation in Committees		8
iii) Moved motions in Council		5
iiii) Provided special skills/knowledge to the Council or committees		4
2. CONTACT WITH ELECTORATE		**20**
i) Meeting with Electorate		11
ii) Office or coordination centre in the constituency		9
3. PARTICIPATION IN LOWER LOCAL GOVERMENT		**10**
i) Attendance in sub-county Council sessions		10
4. MONITORING SERVICE DELIVERY ON NATIONAL PRIORITY PROGRAMMES AREAS		**45**
i) Monitoring of Health Service delivery units		7
ii) Monitoring Agricultural Projects		7
iii) Monitoring Education facilities		7
iv) Monitoring Road projects		7
v) Monitoring Water facilities		7
vi) Monitoring Functional Adult Literacy programmes		5
vii) Monitoring Environment and natural resources		5

Figure 3: ACODE Scorecard components

100 points, similar to school grades in Uganda. Figure 4 depicts an example scorecard from Nakapiripirit District.[3]

Once ACODE completes assembling the scores of all politicians, it holds an annual dissemination event in each district's headquarters. ACODE invites to this event the legislative and bureaucratic district officials as well as other local stakeholders, such as journalists, civil society groups, and traditional and party leaders. In this workshop, ACODE explains the components of the scorecard and reports on each politician's score.

To strengthen the reliability of the disseminated scores, ACODE undertakes several quality-control measures:

- The scorecard undergoes periodic reviews by an expert Taskforce comprised of academics, officials from the Ministry of Local Government, representatives from the parliamentary committee on local governments, district technical and political leaders, and civil society representatives.

[3]Ssemakula, E., G., Longole, L., and Atyang, S., Local Government Councils' Performance and Public Service Delivery in Uganda: Nakapiripirit District Council Score-Card Report 2013/14, Kampala, ACODE Public Service Delivery and Accountability Report Series No.52, 2015.

Nakapiripirit

Name	Sub county	Political Party	Gender	Legislative role	Contact with electorate	Participation in LLGs	Monitoring NPPAs	Total
Ilukol Raphael Lorika	Lorengedwat	NRM	Male	22	20	10	23	75
Longelech John Marko	Loregae Marisetry	NRM	Male	21	11	10	24	66
Sagal William	Nakapiripirit T/C	NRM	Male	13	12	10	18	53
Nanyima Abraham	Lolachat	NRM	Male	12	7	10	21	50
Lochoto Richard Safari	Youth	FDC	Male	15	11	10	18	54
Lorukale Paul	Lorengedwat	NRM	Male	9	13	10	7	39
Loonye John K	Moruita	NRM	Male	5	13	2	13	33
Average Male				14	12	9	18	53
Hellen Pulkol		NRM	Female	17	16	4	17	54
Aluka Lucy	PWD	NRM	Female	14	13	8	18	53
Longole Maria	Lorengedwat	NRM	Female	10	17	10	16	53
Longole Erina	Loregae	NRM	Female	18	2	10	17	47
Aleper Agnes Lokuda	Nabilatuk	NRM	Female	9	17	10	9	45
Kodet Sofia Jane	Kakomongole T.C	NRM	Female	10	4	0	24	38
Chero Scholar Akol	Nabilatuk	NRM	Female	10	2	4	8	24
Lopuwa Lucy	Namalu	NRM	Female	6	5	2	8	21

Figure 4: Scorecard Example - Nakapiripirit District

- District research teams are made up of three people (a lead researcher and two resident assistants of the district) who speak the local languages. Those researchers are not allowed to be involved in electoral or partisan politics. Prior to data collection, the research teams are trained intensively over a centralized three-day Workshop accompanied by an official Researchers' Guide in basic methods, ethics, etc.

- Following data collection, district research teams come together for a three-day workshop to peer-review the information collected and compute scorecard marks. A team of experienced Lead Researchers directly monitor and supervise the research teams, and are also responsible for managing fieldwork and producing district reports, as well as doing on-spot checks.

- The HQ leadership team and a technical backstopping team are responsible for the final review and validation of data used in the scoring. Before publication of the scores, the report is externally reviewed and edited to ensure consistency and quality of content. Thus, the scorecard has a multi-layered review. A full description of the ACODE methodology and reporting can be found at `http://www.acode-u.org/documents/PRS_64.pdf`

We present descriptive statistics of regular politicians and RS-women politicians' scores in Table 8 and Table 9 respectively, for the four years of electoral period, between 2012 and 2015. The average score increases slightly from the first year to the last.

Regular Politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**Observat**
Total Score					
Pooled	55.76	18.06	11	99	840
2012	49.25	15.98	12	87	210
2013	59.19	15.06	21	89	210
2014	58.02	18.92	11	89	210
2015	56.59	20.23	13	99	210
Subscore: Legislative Activity					
Pooled	15.85	4.72	0	25	840
2012	15.37	5.61	1	25	210
2013	16.83	3.85	2	23	210
2014	15.33	4.79	0	23	210
2015	15.85	4.34	1	25	210
Subscore: Meeting with Electorate					
Pooled	13.54	5.77	0	20	
2012	11.94	6.05	0	20	210
2013	14.45	5.06	0	20	210
2014	13.49	5.87	0	18	210
2015	14.28	5.74	0	20	210
Subscore: Monitoring					
Pooled	20.83	10.76	0	47	840
2012	16.55	8.6	1	39	210
2013	21.75	9.31	5	45	210
2014	23.33	11.24	0	42	210
2015	21.7	12.32	0	47	210
Subscore: Lower Local Government					
Pooled	5.55	3.98	0	10	840
2012	5.47	3.78	0	10	210
2013	6.07	3.65	0	10	210
2014	5.9	4.01	0	10	210
2015	4.76	4.34	0	10	210

Table 8: Summary statistics: Scorecard Regular Councilors

RS-Women Politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	
Total Score					
Pooled	49.14	16.94	0	89	840
2012	40.82	16.43	10	81	210
2013	53.37	13.92	23	87	210
2014	51.68	16.8	0	86	210
2015	50.68	17.64	1	89	210
Subscore: Legislative Activity					
Pooled	13.38	5.26	0	25	840
2012	12.34	5.57	1	25	210
2013	15	4.11	2	21	210
2014	12.34	5.69	0	23	210
2015	13.82	5.10	1	25	210
Subscore: Meeting with Electorate					
Pooled	13.03	5.83	0	20	840
2012	10.51	6.21	0	20	210
2013	14.49	4.68	0	20	210
2014	13.38	5.72	0	18	210
2015	13.73	5.84	0	20	210
Subscore: Monitoring					
Pooled	18.02	10	0	45	840
2012	13.51	8.27	0	37	210
2013	18.97	8.62	0	42	210
2014	20.72	10.4	0	42	210
2015	18.9	11	0	45	210
Subscore: Lower Local Government					
Pooled	4.76	3.89	0	10	840
2012	4.48	3.92	0	10	210
2013	4.99	3.76	0	10	210
2014	5.35	3.82	0	10	210
2015	4.22	3.99	0	10	210

Table 9: Summary statistics: Scorecard RS-Women Councilors

A.5 School Grant Applications

During the survey conducted in 2014 we gave the politicians the opportunity to participate in an exercise that mimic a common practice in which politicians help to secure development funds to their constituency from an external organization, in collaboration with the district bureaucracy. We aimed to measure politicians' performance in improving service delivery in the constituency. For that we designed a unique behavioral task in collaboration with our donor partner and the District Education Offices.

Specifically, politicians were given an opportunity to help primary schools in their constituency to apply for a grant to support school improvements. The grant's value, which was advertised after the politician survey in 20 study area districts, was about 100 USD. In order to become eligible for the grant, the politician had to visit the school, mobilize the school principal and representatives of the teachers and parents association to sign a form that was delivered to the district offices. We assigned the grants via a lottery that was carried out at the district level with all the valid applications submitted. The number of grants per district was proportional to the population and ranged between two and five, to ensure equal probability of winning across politicians.

We received a total of 1,662 out of 4,585 possible applications and 61 grants were allocated. Our outcome of interest here is the share of school grant applications out of the total number of schools in a politicians constituency. In Table 10 we present the descriptive statistics of the application. The variable represents the number of applications sent by politicians as a share of the number of schools in their constituency.

Applications for schools					
Regular Politician	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Total Number Applications	3.42	4.28	0	18	158
Sent Application Dummy	0.71	0.46	0	1	158
Relative apps/numb schools	0.45	0.59	0	3.5	158
Relative apps/numb schools (standardized)	-0.03	0.73	-0.58	3.75	158
RS-Women Politician	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Total Number Applications	5.28	6.43	0	28	126
Sent Application Dummy	0.75	0.44	0	1	126
Relative apps/numb schools	0.5	1.02	0	10	126
Relative apps/numb schools (standardized)	0.04	1.26	-0.58	11.79	126

Table 10: Behavioral Measures: Descriptive Statistics

A.6 Background information politicians

The demographic information of the councilors was collected using an in-person survey conducted in summer 2015. In this survey, we collected information from 1131 politicians in the 50 study area districts. In Table 12, we present the descriptive statistics of some of the variables we use throughout the paper as control variables, and in Table13 we show the correlation between these covariates. Some of these variables describe Politicians' background characteristics, while others describe other political factors, such as the party they caucus with, their margin of victory in the previous (2011) elections and an indicator of whether they run unopposed. We also include a proxy for the size of the constituency using the number of votes cast in the previous election.

Regular Politicians	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Politician Education level	9.13	1.79	3	12	487
Below secondary	0.16	0.37	0	1	488
Secondary	0.14	0.35	0	1	488
Post-secondary	0.69	0.46	0	1	488
Politician Age	44.55	10.57	25	78	488
Politician Wealth	0.72	0.66	0	2	488
N. terms as politician	0.48	0.81	0	3	488
NRM	0.83	0.37	0	1	488
Margin Of Victory	0.34	0.3	0	1	488
Constituency Size	5956.25	4442.91	935	29661	356
Desire leave politics	0.16	0.37	0	1	156
Hold leadership position	0.22	0 .42	0	1	488
RS-women Politicians	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Politician Education level	7.83	1.93	3	12	332
Below secondary	0.42	0.49	0	1	332
Secondary	0.19	0.4	0	1	332
Post-secondary	0.39	0.49	0	1	332
Politician Age	44.9	9.4	26	71	332
Politician Wealth	0.49	0.63	0	2	332
N. terms as politician	0.58	0.82	0	3	332
NRM	0.86	0.35	0	1	332
Margin Of Victory	0.38	0.33	0	1	332
Constituency Size	9968.88	6577.68	1090	48787	215
Desire leave politics	0.15	0.35	0	1	123
Hold leadership position	0.12	0 .33	0	1	332

Table 11: Summary statistics: Demographic Information

Regular Politicians	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Politician Education level	2.62	0.72	1	3	154
Below secondary	0.14	0.35	0	1	154
Secondary	0.1	0.3	0	1	154
Post-secondary	0.76	0.43	0	1	154
Politician Age	43.62	10.01	25	76	154
Politician Wealth	0.84	0.67	0	2	154
N. terms as politician	0.44	0.71	0	3	154
NRM	0.77	0.42	0	1	154
Margin Of Victory	0.33	0.28	0	1	154
Constituency Size	6441.47	4053.4	935	19688	116
Desire leave politics	0.16	0.37	0	1	154
Hold leadership position	0.20	0.40	0	1	154
RS-women Politicians	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Politician Education level	2.07	0.91	1	3	120
Below secondary	0.38	0.49	0	1	120
Secondary	0.17	0.37	0	1	120
Post-secondary	0.45	0.5	0	1	120
Politician Age	45.41	9.09	26	67	120
Politician Wealth	0.51	0.62	0	2	120
N. terms as politician	0.54	0.79	0	3	120
NRM	0.83	0.38	0	1	120
Margin Of Victory	0.35	0.3	0.01	1	120
Constituency Size	10365.89	6207.86	1090	48787	81
Desire leave politics	0.14	0.35	0	1	120
Hold leadership position	0.14	0.35	0	1	120

Table 12: Summary statistics: Demographic Information - Sample 25 districts

Application: Uganda Primary School Development Grant			
Councilor Details			
Councilor Name:	Councilor Phone Number:	Councilor Mandate (Circle): Regular District Councilor Special Woman District Councilor	
School Details			
School Name:			
District:	Sub-County:	Parish:	Village:
School Management Contacts			
Head/Deputy Head Teacher Name:		Head/Deputy Head Teacher Phone Number:	
PTA Chairperson Name:		PTA Chairperson Phone Number:	
School Treasurer Name:		School Treasurer Phone Number:	
Narrative and Budget			
Budget Narrative: How would the school use 300,000 Ugx?		Budget:	
School's Bank Account Details			
Bank:	Branch:	Account Number:	
Signatures and Authorization			
Head Teacher Signature and **STAMP:** Date:		DEO Signature and **STAMP:** Date:	
School Treasurer Signature: Date:	PTA/SMC Chairperson Signature: Date:	District Councilor Signature: Date:	

Figure 5: Blank grant application

Variables	Educ (categorical)	Below secondary dummy	Secondary dummy	Post-secondary dummy	Age	Wealth	N. terms politician	NRM	Margin Victory	Size Constituency	Desire leave politics	Leadership
Educ (categorical)	1.000											
Below secondary dummy	-0.911	1.000										
Secondary dummy	-0.156	-0.266	1.000									
Post-secondary dummy	0.923	-0.689	-0.506	1.000								
Age	-0.208	0.198	0.014	-0.184	1.000							
Welath	0.210	-0.160	-0.108	0.219	0.038	1.000						
N. terms politician	-0.016	-0.005	0.050	-0.031	0.350	0.015	1.000					
NRM	-0.071	0.082	-0.030	-0.054	0.151	0.058	0.100	1.000				
Margin Victory	-0.023	0.045	-0.055	-0.003	0.125	0.073	0.092	0.240	1.000			
Size Constituency	-0.088	0.078	0.019	-0.084	-0.024	0.108	-0.017	-0.029	0.003	1.000		
Desire leave politics	-0.000	-0.018	0.048	-0.017	0.304	0.142	0.224	0.093	0.111	-0.039	1.000	
Leadership	0.119	-0.105	-0.029	0.112	-0.006	0.062	-0.014	0.009	0.022	-0.056	0.012	1.000

Note:

Individual Level Politician Covariates Correlation Matrix

Table 13: Politician covariates – correlation table - Complete Sample

Variables	Educ (categorical)	Below secondary dummy	Secondary dummy	Post-secondary dummy	Age	Wealth	N. terms politician	NRM	Margin Victory	Size Constituency	Desire leave politics	Leadership
Educ (categorical)	1.000											
Below secondary dummy	-0.925	1.000										
Secondary dummy	-0.168	-0.220	1.000									
Post-secondary dummy	0.941	-0.740	-0.493	1.000								
Age	-0.221	0.205	0.034	-0.206	1.000							
Welath	0.219	-0.195	-0.056	0.212	0.106	1.000						
N. terms politician	-0.057	0.023	0.088	-0.081	0.273	0.090	1.000					
NRM	-0.105	0.145	-0.104	-0.057	0.203	0.177	0.111	1.000				
Margin Victory	0.005	0.007	-0.031	0.015	0.204	0.136	0.126	0.296	1.000			
Size Constituency	-0.100	0.077	0.056	-0.108	0.044	0.042	-0.035	-0.047	-0.025	1.000		
Desire leave politics	0.014	-0.033	0.050	-0.004	0.294	0.148	0.226	0.090	0.112	-0.035	1.000	
Leadership	0.022	0.024	-0.119	0.060	0.017	0.022	0.061	-0.028	-0.156	0.012	0.017	1.000

Note:

Individual Level Politician Covariates Correlation Matrix

Table 14: Politician covariates – correlation table- Sample 25 districts

A.7 Peer and committee chair assessments

The peer councilor performance data were collected in the endline councilor survey, asking each councilor to rate five other councilors in their district on a scale from 1 to 5.[4] For each councilor an average score is constructed by taking the mean score they received from the councilors in their district. Each councilor thus received between 3-7 peer evaluations (depending on the size of the district's council). The distribution of the average councilor evaluation is presented in Figure **??**. Figure **??** provides information on the distribution of peer evaluations by treatment group.

Regular Councilors	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Average Committee Chair evaluation	7.56	1.95	1	10	210
RS-Women Councilors	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Average Committee Chair evaluation	6.83	1.99	1	10	168

Table 15: Summary statistics: Committee Chairs Assessment

Regular Councilors	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Average peer evaluation	3.26	0.57	1	4.60	151
RS-Women Councilors	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Average peer evaluation	2.91	0.72	1.2	4.67	120

Table 16: Summary statistics: Peer Assessments

A.8 Bureaucrat assessments

In Uganda, civil servants are often referred to as "technocrats." The short technocrats' survey (22 questions) involved 77 respondents and took place between June and August 2015 (concurrent with the endline councilor survey). Survey respondents came from the same 20 districts, with between three and five from each district. The target population were district officers at health, water, education and chief administration offices. Technocrats were contacted and personal appointments made with the district officers. As in all our surveys, standard consent was confirmed prior to administering the survey instrument.

Each councilor was rated on four criteria by each bureaucrat (Ugandan English — technocrat) surveyed within their district (3-5 individuals).[5] Specifically, bureaucrats rated each councilor on the following four performance dimensions using a five-point scale:

1. The number of times a legislator has personally visited or called the technocrat office in the last six months,

[4] *I am now going to give you a list with 5 names of councilors in your district, which we picked randomly. We don?t know them and chose them out of the list of the district councilors. Based on YOUR OWN ideas, could you privately rate the following 5 councilors? general performance? This information will be anonymously added to the responses of others and reported only in aggregate. Thus, privacy will be maintained. (Enum, please give the paper with the ID of the councilor you are surveying, explain the answer options and how to answer. Give the councilor some minutes. Ask him/her to put it in the box with the other responses)*

[5] *This handout is a list of all the LC5 councilors in the district. We would like you to rank them across 4 indicators. 1 indicates not active at all, while 5 indicates the most active a councilor could possibly be in an ideal world. Please circle the ranking for each councilor. This information is confidential — it will be combined with the answers of over 100 other civil servants in the country and the data will not be shared with anyone. Further, It is personal opinion therefore there is no right or wrong answer. If you don't know you can mark IDK. Enum: After explaining the form please read the first question and wait for the respondent to answer for all councilors before reading the next question.*

2. How knowledgeable the district legislator is about standards, rules, and procedures for resource allocation,
3. The quality of the legislator's monitoring of public service delivery,
4. The level of effort the legislator puts into improving public service delivery to ensure standards are met or exceeded in their constituency.

To aggregate this information into a single measure of councilor performance, each councilor's score was averaged over the ratings they received from different technocrats working in their district, these scores were then standardized within districts[6] to yield, for each question, a measure of each councilor's perceived performance by the technocrats within their district. These scores for each question were then averaged to produce a single index for councilor performance. Thus, the score of a councilor is in comparison to the other councilors working within their district.

Since the four performance measures are highly correlated with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.90, we further averaged councilors' ratings on these dimensions across surveyed technocrats, creating a single summary index.

Regular Councilors	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Index Technocrat Assessment	0.04	0.6	-2.15	1.32	485
RS-Women Councilors	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Index Technocrat Assessment	-0.21	0.64	-1.78	1.32	331

Table 17: Summary statistics: Technocrats Evaluations

A.9 Network data

As part of the survey conducted in 2015, we collected information on councilors' professional and personal ties that allowed us to construct 50 independent 'whole" networks. Ties were elicited using a simple name generator technique (Knoke & Yang, 2008). Each surveyed politician was asked to name up to five co-politicians in three meaningful categories of relationships: professional ties (advice) and personal ties (friends). We present below the network elicitation questions verbatim. Armed with these data, we then calculate for each politician, several core centrality measures, as explain in the main text. In Table 19, we present the descriptive statistics of the network centrality measures.

- **Professional:** *Many councilors seek advice from other councilors on how to vote, procedural questions, and issues that come up in committee among other topics. Think of the people you ask for advice to carry out your duties as an LC5 councilor.Please list up to a maximum of 5 people you would be most likely to approach for advice on work related issues.*
- **Personal:** *Which of your fellow councilors you would consider a close friend? By close friend, we mean someone who you trust, cares about your well-being, and who you'd be comfortable looking after your kids. Please list up to 5 of your closest friends.*

[6]That is to say, subtracting the district mean score, and dividing by the district standard deviation.

Additionally, Figure 6 and 7 illustrates the professional and personal network structure, respectively, in which the dots represent the politicians and the lines the unidirectional relationship by defining a tie between i and j if at least one tie exists between them. Figures 8 and 9 depict scatterplots with a lowess regression showing the relationship between professional and personal networks from term start to term end. To do so, we first transform each measure to a within district ranking of centrality.

Regular Politicians	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Degree Professional	0.4	0.19	0.05	1	488
Degree Personal	0.28	0.15	0	0.86	488
InDegree Professional	0.28	0.21	0	1	488
InDegree Personal	0.17	0.13	0	0.86	488
Betweenness Professional	0.05	0.06	0	0.57	488
Betweenness Personal	0.05	0.05	0	0.33	488
Eigenvector Professional	0.61	0.23	0.07	1	488
Eigenvector Personal	0.55	0.24	0	1	488
Closeness Professional	0.62	0.1	0.35	1	488
Closeness Personal	0.5	0.12	0.04	0.88	488
RS-women Politicians	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Degree Professional	0.36	0.17	0.06	1	332
Degree Personal	0.32	0.16	0	0.92	332
InDegree Professional	0.19	0.19	0	0.92	332
InDegree Personal	0.21	0.15	0	0.92	332
Betweenness Professional	0.03	0.04	0	0.33	332
Betweenness Personal	0.06	0.07	0	0.56	332
Eigenvector Professional	0.55	0.22	0.08	1	332
Eigenvector Personal	0.62	0.24	0	1	332
Closeness Professional	0.6	0.09	0.34	1	332
Closeness Personal	0.52	0.13	0.09	0.92	332

Table 18: Summary statistics: Network Data

Regular Politicians	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Degree Professional	0.42	0.27	0.04	1.5	154
Degree Personal	0.44	0.25	0.03	1.71	154
Indegree Professional	0.22	0.13	0	0.71	154
Indegree Personal	0.23	0.14	0	0.86	154
Betweenness Professional	0.07	0.09	0	0.5	154
Betweenness Personal	0.06	0.08	0	0.6	154
Eigenvector Personal	0.53	0.24	0.05	1	154
Eigenvector Professional	0.51	0.25	0.01	1	154
Closeness Professional	0.31	0.24	0.03	1	154
Closeness Personal	0.34	0.19	0.03	1	154
RS-women Politicians	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Degree Personal	0.4	0.24	0	1.43	120
Degree Professional	0.35	0.28	0	1.38	120
Indegree Professional	0.15	0.13	0	0.64	120
Indegree Personal	0.2	0.12	0	0.57	120
Betweenness Professional	0.04	0.06	0	0.32	120
Betweenness Personal	0.07	0.07	0	0.31	120
Eigenvector Personal	0.46	0.23	0	0.98	120
Eigenvector Professional	0.4	0.24	0	1	120
Closeness Professional	0.3	0.23	0.04	1	120
Closeness Personal	0.35	0.19	0.05	1	120

Table 19: Summary statistics: Network Data - Sample 25 districts



Figure 6: The professional network of the 50 legislatures.



Figure 7: The personal network of the 50 legislatures.



Figure 8: Correlation between Within-District Rankings of Professional Network at Baseline and at Endline for Baseline Counselors (by Gender)

A.10 Knowledge Vignettes

Our end-term survey included a section (see Table 22) designed to capture the knowledge of politicians on their legally defined job-duties, broken down by domain: Public Service Delivery, Procedures and Rules of District Council, Passing Bills and Motions and Budget Questions. The questions that capture knowledge of the Budget, were asked using a replication of the budget similar to the one shown in Figure 10. Each correct answer received one point: the maximum knowledge score is therefore 17 points. In Table 21, we present the descriptive statistics of politicians' knowledge by mandate.



Figure 9: Correlation between Within-District Rankings of Personal Network at Baseline and at Endline for Baseline Counselors (by Gender)

Men Politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Knowledge Total	9.82	1.97	4	17	488
Knowledge Public Service Delivery	2.51	1.22	0	6	488
Knowledge Procedures/Rules District Council	3.83	0.8	1	5	488
Knowledge Passing Bills/Motions	1.46	0.61	0	3	488
Knowledge Budget	2.02	0.89	0	4	488
RS-Women Politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Knowledge Total	8.93	2.1	3	15	332
Knowledge Public Service Delivery	2.28	1.19	0	7	332
Knowledge Procedures/Rules District Council	3.6	0.89	1	5	332
Knowledge Passing Bills/Motions	1.35	0.67	0	3	332
Knowledge Budget	1.7	1.06	0	4	332

Table 20: Politicians' Knowledge in Job Duty Domains

Men Politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Knowledge Total	9.9	2.01	5	17	154
Knowledge Public Service Delivery	2.6	1.29	0	6	154
Knowledge Procedures/Rules District Council	3.82	0.82	1	5	154
Knowledge Passing Bills/Motions	1.47	0.57	0	3	154
Knowledge Budget	2.01	0.93	0	4	154
RS-Women Politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Knowledge Total	8.87	2.21	4	15	120
Knowledge Public Service Delivery	2.22	1.12	0	5	120
Knowledge Procedures/Rules District Council	3.58	0.94	1	5	120
Knowledge Passing Bills/Motions	1.38	0.65	0	3	120
Knowledge Budget	1.69	1.08	0	4	120

Table 21: Politicians' Knowledge in Job Duty Domains - Sample 25 districts

Knowledge Questions of Legally Defined Duties	
Public Service Delivery	
1	According to central government national standards, what is the maximum number of pupils one UPE school teacher is allowed to teach?
2	What is the government national standard for the number of pupils who can share one desk?
3	What is the government national standard for the number of school inspections to be carried out by LC5 politicians per term?
4	Let's imagine your district has 100 people. How many of them must live within 5km of a health facility according to the government's national standard for service provision?
5	Per person, what does the government mandate as the guaranteed daily water consumption in liters (or jerrycans) for rural people?
6	For rural people, what is the government standard for the maximum distance in kilometer(s) someone should walk to a water source?
7	By 2015, how many of these people must have service coverage for water according to the government?
Procedures and Rules District Council	
1	According to law, what percentage of politicians must be present at a district council meeting in order to transact business? This is also called "quorum".
2	According to law, in a district council meeting, can quorum be realized if the Chairperson or Vice- Chairperson is absent?
3	According to law, at least how often should committees meet?
4	Imagine you have a petition to bring forward to the district council. According to law, to whom would you present this petition before it is laid on the Table of the Clerk to Council?
5	According to law, is the Speaker allowed to participate in Council debate?
Passing Bills and Motions	
1	According to the Constitution of Uganda, in what instances can a bill passed by the district council supersede the Constitution of Uganda?
2	According to law, after a bill has been published, council debate must take place within how many days?
3	According to law, after bills are passed by LC5 governments, where are they sent for approval?
Budget Questions	
1	Question related to budget of Uganda Example District for the financial year 2013/2014
2	Question related to budget of Uganda Example District for the financial year 2013/2014

Table 22: Example of Knowledge Questions

B Robustness Checks

B.1 Performance Gaps Across Job Duties

In this section we present robustness checks of the main results presented in the section of performance gaps across job duties. Table 23 presents the results for plenary session meetings for the sample of 49

UGANDA BUDGET INFORMATION
Hotline: 0800 229 2229
Website: www.budget.go.ug

Uganda Example District
Sub-county / Division: Mubaga Subcounty
Financial Year: 2013/14
Reporting Period: 2013/14

Parish / Ward	Location	Plan	Status	Budget	Expenditure (Shs Million)					% Spent	Source of Funding
					Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Total		
Responsible Institution: Mubaga Subcounty											
Sector: Health											
Mubaga S/C – Kobowa	Kobowa HC II	Shs 12.4 million was allocated to Kobowa HC III for the costs of providing basic healthcare services between July 2013 and June 2014	Shs 6.3 million were transferred to Kobowa HC III between July 2013 and December 2013 for the costs of providing basic healthcare services	12.40	5.70	0.60	N/A	N/A	6.30	51.1%	Conditional Grant to PHC - development
Responsible Institution: Mubaga Subcounty											
Sector: Education											
Mubaga S/C – Natoro	Natoro	Shs 1.45 million was allocated for supply of 50 3-seater desks to Natoro P/S in the year from July 2013 to June 2014	Shs 1.2 million was spent between July 2013 and December 2014 on Supply of 50 3-seater Desks to Natoro P/S and have been fully supplied.	1.45	0.0	1.20	N/A	N/A	1.20	82.8%	LGMSD (Former LGDP)

Parish / Ward	Location	Plan	Status	Budget	Expenditure (Shs Million)					% Spent	Source of Funding
					Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Total		
Responsible Institution: XXX District											
Sector: Construction											
Mubaga S/C – Gabia	Gabia Trading Center	Shs 19.8 million was allocated for Construction of Ecosan toilet at Gabia Trading center in the year from July 2013 to June 2014	Shs 17.8 million was spent between July 2013 and December 2013 on Construction of Ecosan toilet at Gabia Trading center and the work is complete	19.8	0.0	17.8	N/A	N/A	17.80	90.0%	Conditional Grant for Rural Water
Responsible Institution: XXX District											
Sector: Education											
Mubaga S/C – Bunega	Bunega P/S	Shs 5.3 million was allocated to Bunega P/S to fund costs of running the Primary School between July 2013 and June 2014	Shs 0.0 million were transferred to Bunega P/S between July 2013 and December 2013 to fund costs of running the Primary School	5.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.0	0.00%	Conditional Grant to Primary Education
Mubaga S/C – Matugo	Matugo P/S	Shs 14.1 million was allocated for Construction of 18 five stance latrines at various P/S: at Matugo P/S in the year from July 2013 to June 2014	Shs 0.0 million was spent between July 2013 and December 2013 on Construction of 18 five stance latrines at Matugo P/S and work has not started	14.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.0	0.00%	Conditional Grant to SFG

Figure 10: Example of Budget Questions

districts not weighted by the share of meetings the politician attended to in the legislative period (top panel) and the sample of 19 districts not weighted (middle panel) and weighted (bottom panel) by the share of meetings the politician attended to in the legislative period. Table 24 presents the results for alternative operationalizations of the school grant outcome.

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Observations
Plenary Session Minutes (not weighted by share of meetings attended) - 49 districts					
Total Actions	-0.266***	(0.084)	-0.517***	(0.055)	820
Index Actions	-0.394	(0.243)	-0.503***	(0.063)	820
Motions	-0.039	(0.133)	-0.263***	(0.056)	820
Bills	-0.184***	(0.033)	-0.158**	(0.064)	820
Presentations	-0.274***	(0.077)	-0.236***	(0.060)	820
Remarks	-0.352***	(0.072)	-0.598***	(0.055)	820
Plenary Session Minutes (not weighted by share of meetings attended) - 19 districts					
Total Actions	0.139	(0.126)	-0.569***	(0.110)	274
Motions	-0.307***	(0.069)	-0.254**	(0.110)	274
Bills	0.164	(0.173)	-0.246**	(0.117)	274
Presentations	-0.209**	(0.082)	-0.150	(0.132)	274
Remarks	0.517***	(0.160)	-0.706***	(0.105)	274
Plenary Session Minutes (weighted by share of meetings attended) - 19 districts					
Total Actions	-0.261	(0.159)	-0.550***	(0.105)	274
Motions	-0.226***	(0.072)	-0.216**	(0.099)	274
Bills	0.176	(0.176)	-0.229**	(0.109)	274
Presentations	-0.151	(0.093)	-0.177	(0.135)	274
Remarks	0.659***	(0.208)	-0.703***	(0.106)	274
Share meeting attended	-0.073	(0.110)	-0.032	(0.041)	274

OLS regression analyses with District Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at politician level
Standardized outcome variable
Standard errors are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 23: Legislative Duties Performance: Meeting Minutes.

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Observations
School grant applications					
Number of total applications (stand)	-0.370**	(0.179)	0.092	(0.120)	284
At least one app (stand)	0.240	(0.199)	0.035	(0.115)	284
Number of total applications	3.70***	(0.812)	1.75***	(0.637)	284
At least one app	0.84***	(0.083)	0.023	(0.044)	284

OLS regression analyses with District and year Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at politician level. Standardized outcome variables when indicated. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 24: Politician Performance Alternative Operationalization School Grant by Gender

In Table 25 we present the results of the differences by gender on covariates for the sample of politicians in 19 districts.

	Constant	SE	RS-Women Coefficient	SE	Observations
Background Characteristics					
Education level	2.871***	(0.143)	-0.506***	(0.098)	274
Below Sec	-0.378**	(0.171)	0.547***	(0.118)	274
Secondary	-0.454***	(0.046)	0.126	(0.119)	274
Post Secondary	0.974***	(0.144)	-0.552***	(0.113)	274
Age	-0.629***	(0.191)	0.119	(0.122)	274
Wealth	-0.222	(0.226)	-0.509***	(0.116)	274
N. of terms as politician	-0.317*	(0.171)	0.122	(0.123)	274
Desire leave politics	-0.368***	(0.047)	-0.094	(0.124)	274
Political Factors					
NRM	-0303.	(0.299)	0.116	(0.128)	274
Margin of Victory 2011	-0.312**	(0.123)	0.045	(0.107)	274
Constituency size (numb Votes)	-0.793***	(0.133)	0.664***	(0.115)	197
Run Unopposed	-0.415***	(0.042)	0.139	(0.044)	274
Network Characteristics at TERM START					
In-degree					
Professional	-0.472***	(0.175)	-0.419***	(0.092)	274
Personal	-0.168	(0.129)	-0.257***	(0.079)	274
Eigenvector					
Professional	-0.132	(0.234)	-0.406***	(0.120)	274
Personal	-0.350***	(0.117)	-0.317***	(0.110)	274
Network Characteristics at TERM END					
In-degree					
Professional	0.098	(0.151)	-0.691***	(0.118)	274
Personal	-0.008	(0.200)	0.209*	(0.118)	274
Eigenvector					
Professional	0.476**	(0.212)	-0.486***	(0.115)	274
Personal	0.328	(0.225)	0.484***	(0.135)	274

For brevity, we report the information for each regression by row instead of by column. Regression includes district fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the politician level. All the variables are standardized. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 25: Gender Gaps in Politician Characteristics - Sample 19 districts

B.2 Unrestricted Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variable	Unrestricted	Restricted	Difference
Education level	2.339	2.305	-0.123**
	(0.830)	(0.863)	(0.017)
Wealth	0.630	0.624	-0.019
	(0.638)	(0.660)	(0.640)
Margin of Victory 2011	0.336	0.356	0.073***
	(0.292)	(0.314)	(0.000)
Size Constituency (no. Votes)	4,968.020	5,002.145	124.101
	(2,518.144)	(2,616.112)	(0.428)
Held leadership position	0.138	0.182	0.159***
	(0.345)	(0.386)	(0.000)
Start Professional InD	0.208	0.189	-0.067***
	(0.145)	(0.132)	(0.000)
Start Personal InD	0.235	0.216	-0.070***
	(0.159)	(0.132)	(0.001)
Start Professional EV	0.470	0.460	-0.035
	(0.257)	(0.250)	(0.246)
Start Personal EV	0.519	0.502	-0.058*
	(0.255)	(0.239)	(0.064)
End Professional EV	0.561	0.585	0.086***
	(0.207)	(0.225)	(0.000)
End Personal EV	0.568	0.577	0.033***
	(0.225)	(0.246)	(0.009)
End Professional InD	0.218	0.242	0.089***
	(0.188)	(0.207)	(0.000)
End Personal InD	0.174	0.188	0.048***
	(0.124)	(0.138)	(0.000)
Observations	1,131	820	1,131

Table presenting the difference in means between the characteristics of councilors in the restricted and unrestricted sample. The analysis presented in the main paper uses the restricted sample. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 26: Balance Table Characteristics Restricted and Unrestricted Sample

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Observations
Panel A: Plenary Session Minutes					
Total Actions (Summary Index)	-0.299***	(0.084)	-0.489***	(0.048)	996 (50 districts)
Motions	-0.075	(0.138)	-0.252***	(0.049)	996 (50 districts)
Bills	-0.180***	(0.031)	-0.177***	(0.058)	996 (50 districts)
Presentations	-0.280***	(0.067)	-0.175***	(0.060)	996 (50 districts)
Remarks	-0.371***	(0.065)	-0.571***	(0.049)	996 (50 districts)
Panel Ab: Plenary Session Minutes with attendance					
Total Actions (Summary Index)	-0.280***	(0.079)	-0.512***	(0.052)	915 (48 districts)
Motions	-0.054	(0.127)	-0.273***	(0.053)	915 (48 districts)
Bills	-0.175***	(0.031)	-0.169***	(0.061)	915 (48 districts)
Presentations	-0.278***	(0.064)	-0.184***	(0.063)	915 (48 districts)
Remarks	-0.358***	(0.064)	-0.584***	(0.052)	915 (48 districts)
Share meeting attended	-0.749*	(0.420)	-0.086	(0.058)	915 (48 districts)
Panel B: ACODE scorecard					
Total Score (Summary Index)	-0.305***	(0.086)	-0.314***	(0.059)	514 * 4 yrs (25 districts)
Legislative	0.397***	(0.057)	-0.485***	(0.051)	514 * 4 yrs (25 districts)
Meeting Electorate	-0.386***	(0.116)	-0.036	(0.053)	514 * 4 yrs (25 districts)
Monitoring	-0.398***	(0.070)	-0.220***	(0.070)	514 * 4 yrs (25 districts)
Lower Local Government	-0.151*	(0.087)	-0.140***	(0.049)	514 * 4 yrs (25 districts)
Panel C: School grant applications					
Apps/# schools	0.171	(0.221)	0.120	(0.114)	395 (20 districts)

OLS regression analyses with District and year Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at politician level. Standardized outcome variables. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. In Panel A, Session minutes are weighted by the share of meetings politician attended. In Panel B, we use four annual scorecards; the number of unique councilors is 514.

Table 27: Politician Performance by Gender - Unrestricted sample

	Constant	SE	RS-Women Coefficient	SE	Observations
Background Characteristics					
Education level	2.694***	(0.159)	-0.635***	(0.045)	1131 (49 districts)
Below Sec	-0.503**	(0.198)	0.561***	(0.059)	1131 (49 districts)
Secondary	0.372	(0.314)	0.150**	(0.061)	1131 (49 districts)
Post Secondary	0.211	(0.239)	-0.451***	(0.057)	1131 (49 districts)
Age	-0.429**	(0.212)	0.041	(0.059)	1131 (49 districts)
Wealth	-0.112	(0.155)	-0.556***	(0.057)	1131 (49 districts)
Number of terms	0.116	(0.187)	0.085	(0.059)	1131 (49 districts)
Political Factors					
Desire leave politics	-0.353***	(0.058)	-0.090	(0.101)	386 (19 districts)
NRM	0.105	(0.178)	0.102*	(0.056)	1131 (49 districts)
Margin of Victory 2011	-0.405***	(0.121)	0.148***	(0.055)	1131 (49 districts)
Constituency Size (N. Voters)	-1.043***	(0.117)	0.753***	(0.044)	1131 (49 districts)
Run Unopposed	-0.384***	(0.054)	0.182***	(0.057)	1131 (49 districts)
Network Characteristics at TERM START					
In-degree					
Professional	-0.459*	(0.268)	-0.435***	(0.071)	381 (19 districts)
Personal	0.329	(0.240)	-0.222***	(0.068)	381 (19 districts)
Eigenvector					
Professional	0.219	(0.407)	-0.439***	(0.098)	381 (19 districts)
Personal	0.452**	(0.204)	-0.358***	(0.094)	381 (19 districts)
Network Characteristics at TERM END					
In-degree					
Professional	0.790***	(0.281)	-0.499***	(0.054)	1131 (49 districts)
Personal	0.690	(0.425)	0.237***	(0.054)	1131 (49 districts)
Eigenvector					
Professional	0.695***	(0.204)	-0.390***	(0.052)	1131 (49 districts)

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Covariate coefficient	SE	Observations	% Change	Absolute Change
Legislative activities (scorecard component)									
None	0.373***	(-0.092)	-0.444***	(-0.059)	0	.	1456	.	.
Education	0.385***	(-0.095)	-0.359***	(-0.066)	0.115***	(-0.034)	1456	-19.1%	+0.08
Wealth	0.351***	(-0.098)	-0.424***	(-0.067)	0.026	(-0.035)	1456	-4.6%	+0.02
Margin of Victory	0.371***	(-0.096)	-0.445***	(-0.06)	0.022	(-0.036)	1456	+0.1%	0
Size Constituency	0.296***	(-0.098)	-0.536***	(-0.065)	0.114***	(-0.041)	1456	+20.7%	-0.09
Leadership Position	0.408***	(-0.092)	-0.435***	(-0.06)	0.06**	(-0.028)	1456	-2.1%	+0.01
Start Professional InD	0.34***	(-0.095)	-0.368***	(-0.061)	0.19***	(-0.04)	1456	-17.2%	+0.08
Start Personal InD	0.325***	(-0.105)	-0.401***	(-0.06)	0.2***	(-0.041)	1456	-9.7%	+0.04
Start Professional EV	0.382***	(-0.09)	-0.401***	(-0.06)	0.095***	(-0.033)	1456	-9.8%	+0.04
Start Personal EV	0.323***	(-0.1)	-0.396***	(-0.059)	0.137***	(-0.032)	1456	-11%	+0.05
End Professional InD	0.294***	(-0.096)	-0.378***	(-0.059)	0.187***	(-0.032)	1456	-15%	+0.07
End Personal InD	0.376***	(-0.095)	-0.452***	(-0.059)	0.033	(-0.03)	1456	+1.6%	-0.01
End Professional EV	0.224**	(-0.101)	-0.314***	(-0.059)	0.225***	(-0.031)	1456	-29.3%	+0.13
End Personal EV	0.353***	(-0.096)	-0.457***	(-0.059)	0.076**	(-0.034)	1456	+2.8%	-0.01
All	0.162	(-0.113)	-0.254***	(-0.072)	.	.	1456	-42.8%	+0.19
Lower Local Government participation (scorecard component)									
None	-0.17	(-0.154)	-0.106*	(-0.06)	0	.	1456	.	.
Education	-0.14	(0.158)	-0.134**	(0.067)	-0.029	(0.035)	1456	+26.3%	-0.03
Wealth	-0.14	(0.158)	-0.1	(0.061)	0.018	(0.034)	1456	-5.7%	+0.01
Margin of Victory	-0.133	(0.158)	-0.113*	(0.061)	0.008	(0.041)	1456	+7%	-0.01
Size Constituency	-0.257	(0.16)	-0.21***	(0.066)	0.13***	(0.037)	1456	+98.4%	-0.1
Leadership Position	-0.136	(0.165)	-0.097	(0.06)	0.058**	(0.029)	1456	-8.7%	+0.01
Start Professional InD	-0.176	(0.156)	-0.093	(0.063)	0.032	(0.05)	1456	-12%	+0.01
Start Personal InD	-0.174	(0.156)	-0.102*	(0.06)	0.017	(0.046)	1456	-3.5%	0
Start Professional EV	-0.166	(0.158)	-0.087	(0.059)	0.041	(0.032)	1456	-17.7%	+0.02
Start Personal EV	-0.18	(0.157)	-0.097	(0.06)	0.025	(0.035)	1456	-8.5%	+0.01
End Professional InD	-0.196	(0.15)	-0.052	(0.06)	0.177***	(0.034)	1456	-51.1%	+0.05
End Personal InD	-0.102	(0.154)	-0.131**	(0.062)	0.065**	(0.03)	1456	+23.6%	-0.03
End Professional EV	-0.214	(0.162)	-0.037	(0.063)	0.133***	(0.036)	1456	-65.3%	+0.07
End Personal EV	-0.14	(0.159)	-0.125**	(0.061)	0.062*	(0.035)	1456	+17.5%	-0.02
All	-0.261	(0.162)	-0.14*	(0.076)	.	.	1456	+32.4%	-0.03
Monitoring public services (scorecard component)									
None	0.357**	(0.171)	-0.183***	(0.068)	0	.	1456	.	.
Education	0.44**	(0.175)	-0.139*	(0.076)	0.078**	(0.039)	1456	-24.4%	+0.04
Wealth	0.387**	(0.18)	-0.129*	(0.07)	0.095**	(0.039)	1456	-29.8%	+0.05
Margin of Victory	0.423**	(0.172)	-0.195***	(0.068)	-0.032	(0.044)	1456	+6.3%	-0.01
Size Constituency	0.296	(0.18)	-0.257***	(0.076)	0.092*	(0.047)	1456	+40.2%	-0.07
Leadership	0.394**	(0.177)	-0.174**	(0.067)	0.061	(0.038)	1456	-5.3%	+0.01
Start Professional InD	0.336*	(0.181)	-0.134*	(0.07)	0.123**	(0.051)	1456	-27%	+0.05
Start Personal InD	0.319*	(0.176)	-0.149**	(0.067)	0.16***	(0.049)	1456	-18.8%	+0.03
Start Professional EV	0.368*	(0.187)	-0.135**	(0.068)	0.106***	(0.036)	1456	-26.5%	+0.05
Start Personal EV	0.323*	(0.18)	-0.15**	(0.068)	0.092**	(0.041)	1456	-18%	+0.03
End Professional InD	0.336**	(0.148)	-0.11*	(0.065)	0.247***	(0.038)	1456	-40%	+0.07
End Personal InD	0.475***	(0.171)	-0.225***	(0.067)	0.106***	(0.035)	1456	+23%	-0.04
End Professional EV	0.273*	(0.162)	-0.054	(0.067)	0.249***	(0.037)	1456	-70.8%	+0.13
End Personal EV	0.411**	(0.173)	-0.219***	(0.066)	0.121***	(0.042)	1456	+19.3%	-0.04
All	0.201	(0.177)	0.039	(0.084)	.	.	1456	-121.1%	+0.22

Table reports the information for each regression by row and not by column. Regression includes district and year fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the politician level. All the variables are standardized. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 29: Legislative Activities from Scorecard (top panel), Lower Local Government Participation (middle panel) and Monitoring Public Services (bottom panel) - Sample 19 districts. - Unrestricted

C Politician Perceptions Data

To understand whether politicians of both gender perceived favoritism by the leadership of the legislature, we asked politicians in our survey the following question: *in some districts, council leadership favours male councilors. For example, male councilors may be called on to speak more often than female councilors. In other districts council leadership treats male and female councilors the same. With that in mind, the question is:* [ENUMERATOR: PLEASE HOLD UP 7 POINT SCALE] *On a scale of 1 to 7, to what extent in your district, does council leadership favor male or female councilors? 1 means council leadership favors RS-women completely and 7 means council leadership favors men completely.* We examine in Table 32 whether there are gender differences

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Covariate coefficient	SE	Observations	% Change	Absolute Change
Legislative activities index (meeting minutes) - 19 districts									
None	0.147	(0.109)	-0.547***	(0.091)	0	.	340	.	.
Education	0.085	(0.117)	-0.462***	(0.099)	0.127**	(0.053)	340	-15.4%	+0.08
Wealth	0.165	(0.112)	-0.524***	(0.091)	0.041	(0.046)	340	-4.1%	+0.02
Margin of Victory	0.155	(0.114)	-0.552***	(0.093)	-0.054	(0.053)	340	+1.1%	-0.01
Size Constituency	0.232*	(0.131)	-0.617***	(0.119)	0.086	(0.065)	340	+12.9%	-0.07
Leadership	0.09	(0.106)	-0.532***	(0.09)	0.147***	(0.045)	340	-2.7%	+0.01
Start Professional InD	0.245**	(0.101)	-0.435***	(0.091)	0.243***	(0.077)	340	-20.4%	+0.11
Start Personal InD	0.17*	(0.098)	-0.489***	(0.091)	0.226***	(0.073)	340	-10.6%	+0.06
Start Professional EV	0.154	(0.105)	-0.457***	(0.09)	0.185***	(0.058)	340	-16.5%	+0.09
Start Personal EV	0.166	(0.11)	-0.516***	(0.093)	0.09*	(0.051)	340	-5.7%	+0.03
End Professional InD	0.108	(0.095)	-0.333***	(0.082)	0.339***	(0.07)	340	-39%	+0.21
End Personal InD	0.164	(0.113)	-0.565***	(0.096)	0.054	(0.055)	340	+3.4%	-0.02
End Professional EV	0.045	(0.107)	-0.444***	(0.086)	0.244***	(0.055)	340	-18.7%	+0.1
End Personal EV	0.168	(0.113)	-0.547***	(0.099)	-0.015	(0.049)	340	0%	0
All	0.177	(0.128)	-0.128	(0.116)	.	.	340	-76.5%	+0.42
Legislative activities index (meeting minutes) - 49 districts									
None	-0.299***	(-0.084)	-0.489***	(-0.048)	0	.	996	.	.
Education	-0.339***	(0.08)	-0.408***	(0.053)	0.123***	(0.026)	996	-16.6%	+0.08
Wealth	-0.282***	(0.085)	-0.477***	(0.049)	0.039	(0.025)	996	-2.6%	+0.01
Margin of Victory	-0.29***	(0.082)	-0.497***	(0.049)	-0.008	(0.029)	996	+1.6%	-0.01
Size Constituency	-0.302***	(0.09)	-0.487***	(0.058)	-0.003	(0.033)	996	-0.5%	0
Leadership	-0.375***	(0.107)	-0.466***	(0.048)	0.107***	(0.024)	996	-4.8%	+0.02
End Professional InD	-0.615***	(0.123)	-0.332***	(0.045)	0.307***	(0.031)	996	-32.1%	+0.16
End Personal InD	-0.378***	(0.105)	-0.524***	(0.049)	0.106***	(0.03)	996	+7.1%	-0.03
End Professional EV	-0.495***	(0.103)	-0.399***	(0.048)	0.243***	(0.029)	996	-18.5%	+0.09
End Personal EV	-0.291***	(0.082)	-0.509***	(0.049)	0.05*	(0.029)	996	+4%	-0.02
All	-0.685***	(0.134)	-0.203***	(0.057)	.	.	996	-58.6%	+0.29

Table reports the information for each regression by row and not by column. Regression includes district and year fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the politician level. All the variables are standardized. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 30: Legislative Activities Index from Meeting Minutes in 19 districts (top panel) and same in 49 districts (bottom panel). - Unrestricted

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Observations
Knowledge Questions					
Public Service Delivery	0.552	(0.396)	-0.188***	(0.064)	941 (49 districts)
Procedures/Rules District Council	0.315	(0.242)	-0.289***	(0.064)	941 (49 districts)
Passing Bills/Motions	0.007	(0.205)	-0.223***	(0.065)	941 (49 districts)
Knowledge Budget	-0.045	(0.314)	-0.357***	(0.066)	941 (49 districts)
Knowledge Total	0.437	(0.276)	-0.465***	(0.062)	941 (49 districts)

OLS regression analyses with District and year Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at politician level. Standardized outcome variables. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.Session minutes are weighted by the share of meetings politician attended

Table 31: Politician Performance - Unrestricted Sample

in these perceptions. RS-women are more likely to believe that men are favored, although the majority of both men and RS-women think leadership is equitable (a score of 4).

	(1) Leaders Favor Men
RS-women	0.131***
	(0.026)
Constant	1.006***
	(0.101)
Observations	942

OLS regression analyses. District Fixed Effects. Year Fixed Effects
Standard errors are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 32: Perceptions of Gender Bias by Legislature Leadership

To understand what barriers politicians of both gender perceive there to be for RS-women's performance as politicians, we asked the following question: *There are many challenges that all councilors face to do their job well. However, we are trying to understand challenges that might be UNIQUE to WOMEN LC5 councillors in doing a good job as a councilor. Thinking about your experiences, what is the most important challenge unique to RS-women performing well, if any?* After recording the politician's first reason, they were prompted by asking what the second most important challenge was. We coded one binary variable for each reason if it was mentioned either first or second by a politician: *constituency size* as a mention of constituency size or higher transport costs to serve larger consituency (52% RS-women, 38% men mention); *active discrimination* as active discrimination by council leadership, male councilors, or unwanted advances by male colleagues (sexual harassment) (21% RS-women, 6% men mention); *traditional societal/family gender role* as marriage and family responsibilities, disapproval from family, or motherhood issues (37% RS-women, 47% men mention); *low self esteem* as lack of self confidence (26% RS-women, 45% men mention); and *low qualifications* as lower education, lower social/economic status, or less experience (42% RS-women, 43% men mention).

We examine in Table 33 whether there are statistically significant gender differences in perceptions of barriers to RS-women's performance. RS-women are significantly more likely to mention their constituency size and active discrimination. Men are more likely to say family gender roles and low self esteem. There is no difference in mentioning lower qualifications. These results indicate that RS-women perceive their barriers to be more structural, due to the different institutional aspect of the constituency size, as well as behavior of male colleagues, while men are more likely to cite cultural barriers and emotional flaws.

	(1) Constituency Size	(2) Active Discrimination	(3) Societal/Family Gender Role	(4) Low Self Esteem	(5) Low Qualifications
RS-women	0.713***	1.610***	-0.477***	-0.970***	0.001
	(0.149)	(0.229)	(0.144)	(0.156)	(0.143)
Constant	-1.757***	-17.927	0.358	0.310	0.405
	(0.658)	(1191.030)	(0.526)	(0.537)	(0.531)
Observations	895	739	914	899	915

Logistic regression. District Fixed Effects. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 33: Perceptions of Barriers to RS-Women's Performance

D Gender, Knowledge, and Education

Table 34 presents the results of the knowledge questions regressed in the dummy of RS-women politicians for the sample of 19 districts. Table 35 presents the results of regressing the knowledge index on education.

	Constant	SE	RS-Women	SE	Observations
Knowledge Questions					
Public Service Delivery	0.322	(0.279)	-0.283**	(0.115)	274
Procedures/Rules District Council	0.472	(0.304)	-0.263**	(0.127)	274
Passing Bills/Motions	0.472***	(0.171)	-0.122	(0.117)	274
Knowledge Budget	0.016	(0.206)	-0.328***	(0.121)	274
Knowledge Total	0.534*	(0.279)	-0.465***	(0.120)	274

OLS regression with District Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at politician level

Standardized outcome variable

Standard errors are in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 34: Knowledge of Job Duty Domains and Procedures - Sample 25 districts

	Knowledge Questions - Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Education level (categorical)	0.135***			
	(0.033)			
Below Secondary (dummy)		-0.123***		
		(0.033)		
Secondary (dummy)			-0.016	
			(0.034)	
Tertiary (dummy)				0.126***
				(0.035)
Constant	0.241	0.238	0.265	0.221
	(0.658)	(0.311)	(0.296)	(0.300)
Observations	820	820	820	820

Regression includes district fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the politician level.
All the variables are standardized. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 35: Knowledge and Education

E References

References

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