Political Economy of Developing Countries (PSCI-6104-301)

Guy Grossman

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Class Hours: Thursday 9-12
Class Room: TBA
Office Hours: Mondays 4-5 & by appt.
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Contents

1   Blurb

Welcome to PSCI-6104-301. I am glad you are here!.

When and how do governments deliver public goods and services in response to citizen preferences? In this graduate seminar we review the current literature on government responsiveness, with a focus on public goods and service delivery in developing countries. This seminar focuses (mainly) on contemporary political economy research, and (much) less on seminal works, or the history of ideas about development (broadly defined). In other words, the seminar is explicitly focused on the current state of the literature of some of the core topics of those studying government responsiveness and political accountability in the developing world. The general idea is to assess where the literature currently stands (with respect to topics such as, political accountability, bureaucratic control), while at the same time identifying gaps in the literature and directions for future work.

The course has three main goals. First, the substantive goal is to familiarize students with foundational theoretical arguments and frontier empirical evidence pertaining to central questions in political economy of developing countries. Second, the methodological goal is to expose students to a variety of methodological approaches that are used in cutting-edge research and thereby both encourage and empower them to implement research designs that can effectively address the substantive questions driving their research. Finally, the seminar has a professionalization goal: to expose students to the academic processes of writing reviews, presenting their research, and writing research designs and papers.

2   Course requirements

1. **Attendance**: 10%

   - You are expected to attend all seminar sessions. Though I naturally understand that students may miss a class due to traveling, family events, illness, important errands, etc., in order to get a grade students must attend at least 10 out of the 14 sessions.

2. **Class discussion / participation** (10%)

   - The Syllabus lists required reading that we will go over in class (numbered), and suggested readings (bullet points below the line) . You will be expected to have completed all the required readings before class to the point where you can be called on to critique or defend any reading. This grade is comprised of (a) demonstrating command of readings and material (5 points); (b) actively participating in class by asking questions and making comments on the assigend readins (5 points).

3. **Reading response papers** (3X10=30%)

   - You are required to write three reading response notes (about 3-4 pages long) over the course of the term. Response papers should be uploaded to Canvas by Thursday at 4p, the day before our class meetings. Reading response papers should engage the debates presented in one of the readings for the week. The responses should be thought pieces and will be used to help structure class discussions. Reading responses

should summarize in an opening paragraph the core arguments and findings of the discussed paper(s); highlight 1-2 major contributions of the piece; critique key aspects of the theoretical argument and/or empirical results. Ideally, a good reading response paper should also identify possible extensions for future work and how the week's papers complement and relate to each other. Reading response papers are important part of your professionalization, as they mimic journal reviews.

4. **Presentation** (1X10=10%)

   - Each student will be expected to present one assigned papers in class. These presentations are also part of your professionalization and thus will be structured similarly to conference presentations. Students should prepare for a 15-20 minutes talk in which they will discuss the research question(s), theoretical argument, core results, and main contribution(s). Presentation cannot be on a review paper.

5. **Research paper or research proposal** (40%)

   - You are expected to write an original research paper (20-30 pages long) probing in depth one of the course's themes. Research papers will contain (i) a very clear and concise research question engaging with one of the key themes of the course; (ii) a theoretical argument; (ii) an empirical test of that argument; and (iii) a brief discussion of the policy or theoretical prescriptions resulting from the findings. The empirical part does not have to be "quantitative" but it does have to constitute a genuine test of your argument (repeat after me: qualitative work is empirical evidence).

   - Alternatively, you may write an NSF-like grant proposal (Project Summary, Project Description and References). Proposals should minimally include a motivating question, literature review, key argument (testable hypotheses), and a research design. For more details, see https://new.nsf.gov/funding/preparing-proposal

3 Course policies and logistics

Grade policy

Your course grade is determined according to the following scale:

A+ (4.0): 98-100	C (2.0): 68-69
A (4.0): 90-97	C- (1.7): 66-67
A- (3.7): 85-89	D+ (1.3): 64-65
B+ (3.3): 80-84	D (1.0): 62-63
B (3.0): 75-79	D- (0.7): 60-61
B- (2.7): 72-74	F (0): below 60
C+ (2.3): 70-71	

- Every effort will be made to grade fairly and impartially; however, mistakes sometimes occur. If you have a reservation about how you have been graded, write a comprehensive description of the mistake as you see it. Re-grade requests will only be accepted within a week after the return of graded work.

- In general, grades are not negotiable and I do not award points based on your intention to do well. The only thing that matters in determining your grade is your performance in satisfying the course requirements.

Office Hours

Please sign up to office hours using calendly.com/ggros. Outside of office hours, I will be busy doing other parts of my job (writing scientific papers, applying for grants, supervising graduate students, serving on faculty committees, writing tenure assessment letters etc.). Office hours are the time I have set aside to focus on you. Even if you don't have specific questions, the interactions generated during a good office hour discussion could help clear up any confusion you might have on a topic.

Communication

I will communicate with the class via Canvas. Please be certain that your UPenn email address is an email address you check frequently. To ensure my ability to respond to all student emails in a timely fashion, please be sure to check the course syllabus and Canvas thoroughly for answers to any questions. I respond to emails during normal university work hours, and students can typically expect a response to an email inquiry within two work days. I do not typically respond to emails in the evenings, on weekends or on holidays. I do not respond to unprofessional or rude emails.

Etiquette

Our class is based on mutual respect. Please be considerate of your fellow students and your instructor: show up to class on time, refrain from talking when others are speaking, use your laptop to take notes of what has been discussed and not browse anything unrelated to the course, turn off your cell phone during our meetings, and do not leave the class early unless necessary. Communications with your instructor and classmates, be they in person, over email, or Canvas, should be courteous and professional.

Accommodating tiny children

Tiny children are great. If you are breastfeeding or simply can't find childcare, feel free to bring your baby to class. We'll make it work.

Accommodation for students with disabilities

The University of Pennsylvania encourages the full participation of students with disabilities. Students with disabilities are encouraged to discuss special accommodations that may be needed for successful participation in this course. Specifically, the University accommodates students with disabilities who have registered with the [Office of Student Disabilities Service](). Students must register with the Student Disabilities Services (SDS) to be granted special accommodations for any on-going conditions. For more information on the services that you are entitled to, please refer to the following [guide]().

Religious Accommodation

The University accommodates students whose religious obligations conflict with attendance, submitting assignments, or completing scheduled tests and examinations. Please notify me in advance if you will require any accommodation on these grounds. For more information, please refer to Penn's Policy on Religious Holidays.

Policy on Academic Misconduct

Academic dishonesty will not be tolerated. As outlined in the Student Handbook, "cheating" and "plagiarism" will result in severe disciplinary action on the part of the instructor. Either offense will be grounds for receiving a failing grade (zero points) on the assignment and possibly an "F" for the course, depending on the severity of the offense.

Policy on the use of Generative AI tools

The beta release of ChatGPT in November 2022 is a historical milestone. It is quite likely that using Generative AI tools are going to become an important skill for careers in the not distant future. In the meantime though, it is going to take a while for society (academia included) to figure out when using these tools is and isn't acceptable. There are at least three reasons why:

1. Work created by AI tools may not be considered original work and instead, considered automated plagiarism. AI generated text is derived from previously created texts from sources that the models were trained on (but do not cite).

2. AI models have built-in biases — they are trained on limited underlying sources; they reproduce, rather than challenge, errors in the sources.

3. AI tools have limitations — they lack critical thinking to evaluate and reflect on criteria; they lack abductive reasoning to make judgments with incomplete information at hand.

Given these (important) caveats, some scholars in computational sciences debate if the hype over AI-based tools– especially as "automated plagiarism" tools– should be heeded at all. For the time being, I'm tentatively, pragmatically augmenting my academic integrity policy with a policy regarding a responsible use of AI-based tools in my class.

Academic integrity is a core principle at the University of Pennsylvania and it is critical that all students uphold this principle – whether using AI-based tools or otherwise. For my class, a responsible use of AI-based tools in completing coursework or assessments must be done in accordance with the following:

1. You must clearly identify the use of AI-based tools in your work. Any work that utilizes AI-based tools must be clearly marked as such, including the specific tool(s) used. For example, if you use ChatGPT-3, you must cite "ChatGPT-3. (YYYY, Month DD of query). "Text of your query." Generated using OpenAI. https://chat.openai.com."

2. You must be transparent in how you used the AI-based tool, including what work is your original contribution. An AI detector such as GPTZero (https://gptzero.me/) may be used to detect AI-driven work.

3. You must ensure your use of AI-based tools does not violate any copyright or intellectual property laws.

4. You must not use AI-based tools to cheat on assessments.

5. You must not use AI-based tools to plagiarize without citation.

Violations of this policy will be dealt with in accordance with UPenn's academic integrity policy. If you are found in violation of this policy, you may face penalties such as a reduction in grade, failure of the assignment or assessment, or even failure of the course. Finally, it's your responsibility to be aware of the academic integrity policy and take the necessary steps to ensure that your use of AI-based tools is in compliance with this policy. If you have questions, please speak with me first, as we navigate together how best to responsibly use these tools.

4 Course schedule

4.1 Definitions: Development and government responsiveness (1/18)

Required readings:

1. Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), Introduction and chapters 1-2.

2. Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds. (1999). *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, chapter 1.

3. Mansbridge, Jane. "Rethinking representation." *American Political Science Review* 97.4 (2003): 515-528.

4.2 Representation (1/25)

Learning objectives:

- What does "representation" mean?

- What is the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation?

- Why are marginalized groups (defined by class, race, gender) under-represented?

- What are the mobilization effects of descriptive representation for marginalized groups?

Required readings:

1. Gulzar, Saad, Nicholas Haas, and Benjamin Pasquale. "Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India's Scheduled Areas." *American Political Science Review* 114.4 (2020): 1230-1246.

2. Bueno, Natália S., and Thad Dunning. "Race, resources, and representation: evidence from Brazilian politicians." *World Politics* 69.2 (2017): 327-365.

3. Carnes, Nicholas, and Noam Lupu. "Do voters dislike working-class candidates? Voter biases and the descriptive underrepresentation of the working class." *American Political Science Review* 110.4 (2016): 832-844.

4. Goyal, Tanushree. "Representation from below: How women's grassroots party activism promotes equal political participation." *American Political Science Review* (2023) *First View*.

5. Desai, Zuheir, and Anderson Frey. "Can descriptive representation help the right win votes from the poor? Evidence from Brazil." *American Journal of Political Science* 67.3 (2023): 671-686.

Normative theories of representation:

- Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. "The Concept of Representation." University of California Press, 1967.

- Mansbridge, Jane. "Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? A contingent "yes"." *The Journal of Politics* 61.3 (1999): 628-657.

Relationship between descriptive and substantive representation

- Jensenius, Francesca Refsum. "Development from representation? A study of quotas for the scheduled castes in India." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 7.3 (2015): 196-220.

- Deininger, Klaus, Songqing Jin, Hari K. Nagarajan, and Fang Xia. "Does female reservation affect long-term political outcomes? Evidence from rural India." *The Journal of Development Studies* 51.1 (2015): 32-49.

- Bhalotra, Sonia, Irma Clots-Figueras, and Lakshmi Iyer. "Pathbreakers? Women's electoral success and future political participation." *The Economic Journal* 128.613 (2018): 1844-1878.

Under representation

- Schwarz, Susanne, and Alexander Coppock. "What have we learned about gender from candidate choice experiments? A meta-analysis of sixty-seven factorial survey experiments." *The Journal of Politics* 84.2 (2022): 655-668.

- Carnes, Nicholas, and Noam Lupu. "Rethinking the comparative perspective on class and representation: Evidence from Latin America." *American Journal of Political Science* 59.1 (2015): 1-18.

Downstream effect of representation of marginalized groups

- Chauchard, Simon. "Can descriptive representation change beliefs about a stigmatized group? Evidence from rural India." *American Political Science Review* 108.2 (2014): 403-422.

- Fergusson, Leopoldo, Pablo Querubin, Nelson A. Ruiz, and Juan F. Vargas. "The Real Winner's curse." *American Journal of Political Science* 65.1 (2021): 52-68.

- Grossman, Guy, and Stephanie Zonszein. "Voted in, standing out: Public response to immigrants' political accession. *American Journal of Political Science* 2022. *Forthcoming*.

Useful reviews

- Clayton, Amanda. "How do electoral gender quotas affect policy?." *Annual Review of Political Science* 24 (2021): 235-252.

- Carnes, Nicholas, and Noam Lupu. "The economic backgrounds of politicians." *Annual Review of Political Science* 26 (2023): 253-270.

4.3 Electoral Accountability – information (2/1)

Learning objectives:

- Increase familiarity with core formal models of electoral accountability.

- When is information likely to strengthen electoral accountability?

Required readings:

1. Ashworth, Scott. "Electoral accountability: Recent theoretical and empirical work." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (2012): 183-201.

2. Dunning, Thad, et al. "Voter information campaigns and political accountability: Cumulative findings from a preregistered meta-analysis of coordinated trials." *Science Advances* 5.7 (2019): eaaw2612.

3. Casey, Katherine. "Crossing party lines: The effects of information on redistributive politics." *American Economic Review* 105.8 (2015): 2410-2448.

4. Enrcíquez, J., H. Larreguy, J. Marshall, and A. Simpser. "Mass political information on social media: Facebook ads, electoral saturation, and electoral accountability in Mexico." *Journal of the European Economic Association* (2023): Forthcoming.

5. Grossman, Guy, Kristin Michelitch, and Carlo Prato. "The effect of sustained transparency on electoral accountability." *American Journal of Political Science* (2023) *First View*.

6. Larreguy, Horacio, John Marshall, and James M. Snyder Jr. "Publicising Malfeasance: When the local media structure facilitates electoral accountability in Mexico." *The Economic Journal* 130.631 (2020): 2291-2327.

Models:

- Fearon, James D. "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance." in (ed.) A Przeworski, S Stokes, B Manin, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, 1999.

- Besley, Timothy. *Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government*. Oxford University Press, 2006.

- Prat, Andrea. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency." *American Economic Review* 95.3 (2005): 862-877.

Media:

- Besley, Timothy & Robin Burgess. (2002). "The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(4): 1415-1451.

- Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan. "Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123.2 (2008): 703-745.

Audits:

- Bobonis, Gustavo J., Luis R. Cámara Fuertes & Rainer Schwabe. "Monitoring Corruptible Politicians." *American Economic Review* 106.8 (2016): 2371-2405.

- Berliner, Daniel, and Joachim Wehner. "Audits for accountability: evidence from municipal by-elections in South Africa." *The Journal of Politics* 84.3 (2022): 1581-1594.

Researchers' led information dissemination before elections:

- Grossman, Guy & Kristin Michelitch. "Information dissemination, competitive pressure, and politician performance between elections: A field experiment in Uganda." *American Political Science Review* 112.2 (2018): 280-301.

- Arias, Eric, Pablo Balán, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubín. "Information provision, voter coordination, and electoral accountability: Evidence from Mexican social networks." *American Political Science Review* 113.2 (2019): 475-498.

- Adida, Claire, Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon, and Gwyneth McClendon. "When does information influence voters? The joint importance of salience and coordination." *Comparative Political Studies* 53.6 (2020): 851-891.

- Bhandari, Abhit, Horacio Larreguy, and John Marshall. "Able and mostly willing: An empirical anatomy of Information's effect on voter-driven accountability in Senegal." *American Journal of Political Science* 67.4 (2023): 1040-1066.

Debates and deliberative forums:

- Bidwell, Kelly, Katherine Casey, and Rachel Glennerster. "Debates: Voting and expenditure responses to political communication." *Journal of Political Economy* 128.8 (2020): 2880-2924.

- Platas, Melina R., and Pia J. Raffler. "Closing the gap: Information and mass support in a dominant party regime." *The Journal of Politics* 83.4 (2021): 1619-1634.

- Bowles, Jeremy, and Horacio Larreguy. "Who debates, who wins? At-scale experimental evidence on the supply of policy information in a Liberian election." (2023).

- López-Moctezuma, Gabriel, Leonard Wantchekon, Daniel Rubenson, Thomas Fujiwara, and Cecilia Pe Lero. "Policy deliberation and voter persuasion: Experimental evidence from an election in the Philippines." *American Journal of Political Science* 66.1 (2022): 59-74.

Useful reviews:

- Pande, Rohini. 2011. "Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies." *Annual Revue of Economics* 3(1): 215-237.

- Kosack, Stephen, and Archon Fung. "Does transparency improve governance?." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (2014): 65-87.

4.4 Ill-informed voters (2/8)

Learning objectives:

- If information is important for accountability, why are many voters uninformed?

    – Media control, censorship and their challenges to electoral accountability.

    – Low information equilibrium.

    – Attribution errors and electoral accountability.

    – Misinformation and political outcomes.

Required readings:

1. Peisakhin, Leonid, and Arturas Rozenas. "Electoral effects of biased media: Russian television in Ukraine." *American Journal of Political Science* 62.3 (2018): 535-550.

2. Boas, Taylor C., and F. Daniel Hidalgo. "Controlling the airwaves: Incumbency advantage and community radio in Brazil." *American Journal of Political Science* 55.4 (2011): 869-885.

3. Casey, Katherine, and Rachel Glennerster. "The Incentives to (Not) Debate in Low Information Races." *Unpublished manuscript* (2022).

4. Hayes, Rosa C., Masami Imai, and Cameron A. Shelton. "Attribution error in economic voting: Evidence from trade shocks." *Economic Inquiry* 53.1 (2015): 258-275.

5. Jensenius, Francesca R., and Pavithra Suryanarayan. "Party system institutionalization and economic voting: Evidence from India." *The Journal of Politics* 84.2 (2022): 814-830.

6. Batista Pereira, Frederico, Natália S. Bueno, Felipe Nunes, and Nara Pavão. "Fake news, fact-checking, and partisanship: the resilience of rumors in the 2018 Brazilian elections." *The Journal of Politics* 84.4 (2022): 2188-2201.

Media control and censorship:

- Gehlbach, Scott, and Konstantin Sonin. "Government control of the media." *Journal of Public Economics* 118 (2014): 163-171.

- Besley, Timothy, and Andrea Prat. "Handcuffs for the grabbing hand? Media capture and government accountability." *American Economic Review* 96.3 (2006): 720-736.

- Hobbs, William R., and Margaret E. Roberts. "How sudden censorship can increase access to information." *American Political Science Review* 112.3 (2018): 621-636.

- Roberts, Margaret. *Censored: distraction and diversion inside China's Great Firewall.* Princeton University Press, 2018.

- Adiguzel, Fatih Serkant, Diego Romero, and Erik Wibbels. "Democratic Backsliding and Media Responses to Government Repression: Machine Learning Evidence from Tanzania." *Unpublished manuscript* (2023)

Misinformation:

- Martinez, Luis R. "How much should we trust the dictator's GDP growth estimates?." *Journal of Political Economy* 130.10 (2022): 2731-2769.

- Huang, Haifeng. "A war of (mis) information: The political effects of rumors and rumor rebuttals in an authoritarian country." *British Journal of Political Science* 47.2 (2017): 283-311.

- Michener, Gregory, and Simeon Nichter. "Local compliance with national transparency legislation." *Government Information Quarterly* 39.1 (2022): 101659.

- Badrinathan, Sumitra. "Educative interventions to combat misinformation: Evidence from a field experiment in India." *American Political Science Review* 115.4 (2021): 1325-1341.

- Porter, Ethan, and Thomas J. Wood. "The global effectiveness of fact-checking: Evidence from simultaneous experiments in Argentina, Nigeria, South Africa, and the United Kingdom." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118.37 (2021): e2104235118.

Attribution errors:

- Leigh, Andrew. "Does the world economy swing national elections?." *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 71.2 (2009): 163-181.

- Healy, Andrew J., Neil Malhotra, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. "Irrelevant events affect voters' evaluations of government performance." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107.29 (2010): 12804-12809.

- Campello, Daniela, and Cesar Zucco. *The volatility curse: Exogenous shocks and representation in resource-rich democracies.* Cambridge University Press, 2020.

- Novaes, Lucas M., and Luis Schiumerini. "Commodity shocks and incumbency effects." *British Journal of Political Science* 52.4 (2022): 1689-1708.

- Hart, Austin Ray, and J. Scott Matthews. "Quality Control: Experiments on the Microfoundations of Retrospective Voting." *Elements in Experimental Political Science* (2023).

Endogenous acquisition of political information:

- Marshall, John. "Signaling sophistication: How social expectations can increase political information acquisition." *The Journal of Politics* 81.1 (2019): 167-186.

Useful reviews:

- Anderson, Christopher J. "The end of economic voting? Contingency dilemmas and the limits of democratic accountability." *Annual Review of Political Science* 10 (2007): 271-296.

- Healy, Andrew, and Neil Malhotra. "Retrospective voting reconsidered." *Annual Review of Political Science* 16 (2013): 285-306.

- Roberts, Margaret E. "Resilience to online censorship." *Annual Review of Political Science* 23 (2020): 401-419.

4.5 Under-used political information (2/15)

Learning objectives:

- Why do (many) voters choose not to use available information to inform their vote?

    - Voters expect incumbents to engage in corruption in the second term.
    - Politicians respond strategically to minimize the effects of (bad) information.
    - Clientelism and vote buying undermine the use of performance information.
    - Voters have other strong attachments.

Require readings:

1. Svolik, Milan W. "Learning to love democracy: Electoral accountability and the success of democracy." *American Journal of Political Science* 57.3 (2013): 685-702.

2. Weaver, Julie Anne. "Electoral Dis-Connection: The Limits of Reelection in Contexts of Weak Accountability." *The Journal of Politics* 83.4 (2021): 1462-1477.

3. Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer, and Julien Labonne. "Buying informed voters: New effects of information on voters and candidates." *The Economic Journal* 131.635 (2021): 1105-1134.

4. Cruz, Cesi, Philip Keefer, Julien Labonne, and Francesco Trebbi. "Making policies matter: Voter responses to campaign promises." *Unpublished manuscript* (2023).

5. Boas, Taylor C., F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Marcus André Melo. "Norms versus action: Why voters fail to sanction malfeasance in Brazil." *American Journal of Political Science* 63.2 (2019): 385-400.

6. Goyal, Tanushree. "Do citizens enforce accountability for public goods provision? Evidence from India's rural roads program." *The Journal of Politics*. (2023) *First View*.

Incumbency (dis)advantage in developing countries:

- Klašnja, Marko. "Corruption and the incumbency disadvantage: Theory and evidence." *The Journal of Politics* 77.4 (2015): 928-942.

- Klašnja, Marko, Noam Lupu, and Joshua A. Tucker. "When do voters sanction corrupt politicians?." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 8.2 (2021): 161-171.

- Lewis, Blane D., Hieu TM Nguyen, and Adrianus Hendrawan. "Political accountability and public service delivery in decentralized Indonesia: Incumbency advantage and the performance of second term mayors." *European Journal of Political Economy* 64 (2020): 101910.

Voters don't think alternatives are any better:

- Agerberg, Mattias. "The lesser evil? Corruption voting and the importance of clean alternatives." *Comparative Political Studies* 53.2 (2020): 253-287.

- Muñoz, Jordi, Eva Anduiza, and Aina Gallego. "Why do voters forgive corrupt mayors? Implicit exchange, credibility of information and clean alternatives." *Local Government Studies* 42.4 (2016): 598-615.

- Mares, Isabela, and Giancarlo Visconti. "Voting for the lesser evil: Evidence from a conjoint experiment in Romania." *Political Science Research and Methods* 8.2 (2020): 315-328.

Clientelism undermines the use of performance information:

- Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, and Marcelo Nazareno. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics.* Cambridge University Press, 2013.

- Nichter, Simeon. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot." *American Political Science Review* 102.1 (2008): 19-31.

- Hidalgo, F. Daniel & Simeon Nichter. 2016. "Voter Buying: Shaping the Electorate through Clientelism." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(2): 436-455.

- Rueda, Miguel R. "Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation: Vote Buying Enforcement and Collective Monitoring." *American Journal of Political Science* 61.1 (2017): 163-177.

- Michael Auerbach, Adam, and Tariq Thachil. "Cultivating clients: reputation, responsiveness, and ethnic indifference in India's slums." *American Journal of Political Science* 64.3 (2020): 471-487.

- Rains, Emily, and Erik Wibbels. "Informal Work, Risk, and Clientelism: Evidence from 223 Slums across India." *British Journal of Political Science* 53.1 (2023): 1-24.

Voters have other attachments / performance information is not salient:

- Adida, Claire, Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon, and Gwyneth McClendon. "Overcoming or reinforcing coethnic preferences? an experiment on information and ethnic voting." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 12.4 (2017): 437-477.

- De Kadt, Daniel, and Evan S. Lieberman. "Nuanced accountability: Voter responses to service delivery in southern Africa." *British Journal of Political Science* 50.1 (2020): 185-215.

Voters reject performance information due to motivated reasoning:

- Arceneaux, Kevin, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen. *Taming intuition: How reflection minimizes partisan reasoning and promotes democratic accountability*. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

- Little, Andrew T., Keith E. Schnakenberg, and Ian R. Turner. "Motivated reasoning and democratic accountability." *American Political Science Review* 116.2 (2022): 751-767.

Useful reviews:

- De Vries, Catherine E., and Hector Solaz. "The Electoral Consequences of Corruption." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017): 391-408.

- Hicken, Allen, and Noah L. Nathan. "Clientelism's red herrings: dead ends and new directions in the study of nonprogrammatic politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 23 (2020): 277-294.

4.6 Institutional mediators of political accountability (2/22)

Learning objectives:

- Term limits effect on accountability

- Campaign finance

    - The effect of campaign spending limits
    - Do politicians engage in quid-pro-quo with campaign contributors?

- Compulsory voting

Require readings:

1. Klašnja, Marko, and Rocío Titiunik. "The incumbency curse: Weak parties, term limits, and unfulfilled accountability." *American Political Science Review* 111.1 (2017): 129-148.

2. Avis, Eric, Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan, and Carlos Varjão. "Money and politics: The effects of campaign spending limits on political entry and competition." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 14.4 (2022): 167-199.

3. Gulzar, Saad, Miguel R. Rueda, and Nelson A. Ruiz. "Do campaign contribution limits curb the influence of money in politics?." *American Journal of Political Science* 66.4 (2022): 932-946.

4. Harding, Robin, Mounu Prem, Nelson A. Ruiz, and David L. Vargas. "Buying a Blind Eye: Campaign Donations, Regulatory Enforcement, and Deforestation." *American Political Science Review* (2023): *First View*.

5. León, Gianmarco. "Turnout, political preferences, and information: Experimental evidence from Peru." *Journal of Development Economics* 127 (2017): 56-71.

Term limits models:

- Smart, Michael, and Daniel M. Sturm. "Term limits and electoral accountability." *Journal of Public Economics* 107 (2013): 93-102.

- Duggan, John. "Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections." *Journal of Economic Theory* 170 (2017): 426-463.

- Gieczewski, Germán. "Term Limits and Bargaining Power in Electoral Competition." *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics* 14.3 (2022): 1-34.

Term limits and accountability: empirical papers:

- Christensen, Darin, and Francisco Garfias. "The politics of property taxation: Fiscal infrastructure and electoral incentives in Brazil." *The Journal of Politics* 83.4 (2021): 1399-1416.

- Labonne, Julien, Sahar Parsa, and Pablo Querubin. "Political dynasties, term limits, and female political empowerment: Evidence from the Philippines." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 182 (2021): 212-228.

Campaign finance models:

- Ashworth, Scott. "Campaign finance and voter welfare with entrenched incumbents." *American Political Science Review* 100.1 (2006): 55-68.

- Prato, Carlo, and Stephane Wolton. "Campaign cost and electoral accountability." *Political Science Research and Methods* 7.1 (2019): 1-21.

Campaigns affect vote choice:

- Le Pennec, Caroline, and Vincent Pons. "How do Campaigns Shape Vote Choice? Multi-country Evidence from 62 Elections and 56 TV Debates." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 138.2 (2023): 703-767.

- Carvalho, Bruno Pessoa. "Campaign spending in local elections: the effects of public funding." *Unpublished manuscript* (2023).

Quid-pro-quo with campaign contributors:

- Boas, Taylor C., F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Neal P. Richardson. "The spoils of victory: campaign donations and government contracts in Brazil." *The Journal of Politics* 76.2 (2014): 415-429.

- Vaishnav, Milan. *When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics*. Yale University Press, 2017.

- Szakonyi, David. "Businesspeople in elected office: Identifying private benefits from firm-level returns." *American Political Science Review* 112.2 (2018): 322-338.

- Weschle, Simon. *Money in Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2022.

- Ruiz, Nelson A. "The Power of Money: The Consequences of Electing a Donor Funded Politician." *Unpublished manuscript* (2023).

Compulsory voting:

- Singh, Shane P. "Compulsory Voting and Parties' Vote-Seeking Strategies." *American Journal of Political Science* 63.1 (2019): 37-52.

- Freire, Alessandro, and Mathieu Turgeon. "Random votes under compulsory voting: Evidence from Brazil." *Electoral Studies* 66 (2020): 102168.

- Gonzales, Mariella, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta, and Luis R. Martínez. "How effective are monetary incentives to vote? Evidence from a nationwide policy." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 14.1 (2022): 293-326.

Useful review:

- Jacobson, Gary C. "How do campaigns matter?." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18 (2015): 31-47.

4.7 Accountability barrier: electoral manipulation (2/29)

Learning objectives:

- Detecting election fraud

- Politicians' incentives to engage in election manipulation

- Voting aggregation fraud

Required readings:

1. Cantú, Francisco. "The fingerprints of fraud: Evidence from Mexico's 1988 presidential election." *American Political Science Review* 113.3 (2019): 710-726.

2. Rozenas, Arturas. "Office Insecurity and Electoral Manipulation. *The Journal of Politics* 78.1 (2016): 232-248.

3. Rueda, Miguel R., and Nelson A. Ruiz. "Political agency, election quality, and corruption." *The Journal of Politics* 82.4 (2020): 1256-1270.

4. Klašnja, Marko, and Grigore Pop-Eleches. "Anticorruption efforts and electoral manipulation in democracies." *The Journal of Politics* 84.2 (2022): 739-752.

5. Callen, Michael, and James D. Long. "Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan." *American Economic Review* 105.1 (2015): 354-381.

6. Von Borzyskowski, Inken, & Patrick M. Kuhn. (2020). "Dangerously informed: Voter information and pre-electoral violence in Africa." *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 15-29.

Election manipulation forensic:

- Beber, Bernd, and Alexandra Scacco. "What the Numbers Say: A Digit-Based Test for Election Fraud." *Political analysis* 20.2 (2012): 211-234.

- Montgomery, Jacob M., Santiago Olivella, Joshua D. Potter, and Brian F. Crisp. "An informed forensics approach to detecting vote irregularities." *Political Analysis* 23.4 (2015): 488-505.

- Rozenas, Arturas. "Detecting Election Fraud from Irregularities in Vote-Share Distributions." *Political Analysis* 25.1 (2017): 41-56.

- Walter R. Mebane, Jr., Diogo Ferrari, Kevin McAlister, and Patrick Y. Wu. " Measuring Election Frauds." *Unpublished manuscript* (2022).

Election manipulation models:

- Collier, Paul, and Pedro C. Vicente. "Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Public choice* 153.1-2 (2012): 117-147.

- Rundlett, Ashlea and Milan W. Svolik. "Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud." *American Political Science Review* 110.1 (2016): 180-197.

- Chaves, Isaías, Leopoldo Fergusson, James A. Robinson. "He who counts elects: Economic elites, political elites, and electoral fraud." *Economics & Politics* 27.1 (2015): 124-159.

- Luo, Zhaotian, and Arturas Rozenas. "Strategies of election rigging: trade-offs, determinants, and consequences." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 13.1 (2018): 1-28.

Election manipulation empirics:

- Little, Andrew T., Joshua A. Tucker, and Tom LaGatta. "Elections, protest, and alternation of power." *The Journal of Politics* 77.4 (2015): 1142-1156.

- Reuter, Ora John, and David Szakonyi. "Electoral manipulation and regime support: survey evidence from Russia." *World Politics* 73.2 (2021): 275-314.

- Higashijima, Masaaki. *The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies*. University of Michigan Press, 2022.

Voter aggregation fraud:

- Sjoberg, Fredrik M. "Autocratic adaptation: The strategic use of transparency and the persistence of election fraud." *Electoral Studies* 33 (2014): 233-245.

- Gehlbach, Scott, and Alberto Simpser. "Electoral manipulation as bureaucratic control." *American Journal of Political Science* 59.1 (2015): 212-224.

- Rueda, Miguel, Guy Grossman, and Shuning Ge. "Do More Disaggregated Electoral Results Deter Aggregation Fraud?." *Unpublished manuscript* (2023).

Electoral violence:

- Fjelde, Hanne, and Kristine Höglund. "Electoral institutions and electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa." *British Journal of Political Science* 46.2 (2016): 297-320.

- Birch, Sarah, Ursula Daxecker, and Kristine Höglund. "Electoral violence: An introduction." *Journal of Peace Research* 57.1 (2020): 1-14.

- Daxecker, Ursula. "Unequal votes, unequal violence: Malapportionment and election violence in India." *Journal of Peace Research* 57.1 (2020): 156-170.

- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski. "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?" *British Journal of Political Science* 44.1 (2014): 149-179.

- Condra, Luke N., James D. Long, Andrew C. Shaver, and Austin L. Wright. "The Logic of Insurgent Electoral Violence." *American Economic Review* 108.11 (2018): 3199-3231.

Useful reviews

- Lehoucq, Fabrice. "Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences." *Annual Review of Political Science* 6 (2003): 233-256.

- Mares, Isabela., & Lauren E. Young 2016. "Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19: 267-288.

4.8 Constituency services (3/14)

Learning objectives:

- The centrality of constituency services for the work of elected politicians.

- Sources of discrimination in politicians' response to citizens' request.

- Which constituents are more likely to request services?

- What is the potential of information technologies to scale up constituency services?

Required readings:

1. Bussell, Jennifer. *Clients and constituents: Political responsiveness in patronage democracies. Oxford University Press* (2019), chapters 2-3.

2. Driscoll, Amanda, Gabriel Cepaluni, Feliciano de Sá Guimaraes, and Paolo Spada. "Prejudice, strategic discrimination, and the electoral connection: Evidence from a pair of field experiments in Brazil." *American Journal of Political Science* 62.4 (2018): 781-795.

3. Gaikwad, Nikhar, and Gareth Nellis. "Do politicians discriminate against internal migrants? Evidence from nationwide field experiments in India." *American Journal of Political Science* 65.4 (2021): 790-806.

4. Auerbach, Adam Michael, and Gabrielle Kruks-Wisner. (2020). "The Geography of Citizenship Practice: How the Poor Engage the State in Rural and Urban India." *Perspectives on Politics* 18(4): 1118-1134.

5. Golden, Miriam, Saad Gulzar, and Luke Sonnet. "'Press 1 for Roads': Improving Political Communication with New Technology." Unpublished manuscript (2023).

6. Grossman, Guy, Macartan Humphreys, and Gabriella Sacramone-Lutz. "Information Technology and Political Engagement: Mixed evidence from Uganda." *The Journal of Politics* 82.4 (2020): 1321-1336.

Models:

- Ashworth, Scott. "Reputational dynamics and political careers." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 21.2 (2005): 441-466.

Politicians' response to citizens' request:

- McClendon, Gwyneth H. (2016). "Race and responsiveness: An experiment with South African politicians." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 3(1): 60-74.

- Costa, Mia. "How responsive are political elites? A meta-analysis of experiments on public officials." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 4.3 (2017): 241-254.

- McAndrews, John R., Jonah I. Goldberg, Peter John Loewen, Daniel Rubenson, and Benjamin Allen Stevens. "Nonelectoral Motivations to Represent Marginalized Groups in a Democracy: Evidence from an Unelected Legislature." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 46.4 (2021): 961-994

- Barcelo, Joan, and Mauricio Vela Baron. "Political Responsiveness to Conflict Victims: Evidence from a Countrywide Audit Experiment in Colombia." *American Political Science Review* (2023): *First View*.

Citizens' demand side:

- Grossman, Guy, Macartan Humphreys, and Gabriella Sacramone-Lutz. ""I wld like u WMP to extend electricity 2 our village": On Information Technology and Interest Articulation." *American Political Science Review* 108.3 (2014): 688-705.

- Grossman, Guy, Kristin Michelitch, and Marta Santamaria. "Texting complaints to politicians: Name personalization and politicians' encouragement in citizen mobilization." *Comparative Political Studies* 50.10 (2017): 1325-1357.

- Kruks-Wisner, Gabrielle. *Claiming the state: Active citizenship and social welfare in rural India.* Cambridge University Press, 2018.

- Auerbach, Adam Michael. *Demanding development: The politics of public goods provision in India's urban slums.* Cambridge University Press, 2019.

- Prillaman, Soledad Artiz. "Strength in numbers: how women's groups close India's political gender gap." *American Journal of Political Science*, 67.2 (2023): 390-410.

Information technology and constituency services:

- Grossman, Guy, Melina R. Platas, and Jonathan Rodden. "Crowdsourcing accountability: ICT for service delivery." *World Development* 112 (2018): 74-87.

- Buntaine, Mark T., Patrick Hunnicutt, and Polycarp Komakech. "The challenges of using citizen reporting to improve public services: A field experiment on solid waste services in Uganda." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 31.1 (2021): 108-127.

- Ferrali, Romain, Guy Grossman, Melina R. Platas, and Jonathan Rodden. "It takes a village: Peer effects and externalities in technology adoption." *American Journal of Political Science* 64.3 (2020): 536-553.

- Christensen, Darin, and Simon Ejdemyr. "Do elections improve constituency responsiveness? Evidence from US cities." *Political Science Research and Methods* 8.3 (2020): 459-476.

- O'Brochta, William. "Politicians' complaint response: E-governance and personal relationships." *Governance* 36.4 (2023): 1147-1164.

Constituency services in autocracies:

- Distelhorst, Greg, and Yue Hou. "Constituency service under nondemocratic rule: Evidence from China." *The Journal of Politics* 79.3 (2017): 1024-1040.

- York, Erin. "Votes for effort: constituency service and opposition support under autocracy." *Unpublished manuscript* (2023).

4.9 Political Selection (3/21)

Learning objectives:

- Familiarity with core models of political selection.

- The quality of office holders is consequential.

- The importance of politician networks and remuneration for political entry.

- Recruitment and institutional determinants.

Required readings:

1. Besley, Timothy. "Political Selection." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19.3 (2005): 43-60.

2. Grossman, Guy, and W. Walker Hanlon. "Do better monitoring institutions increase leadership quality in community organizations? Evidence from Uganda." *American Journal of Political Science* 58.3 (2014): 669-686.

3. Gulzar, Saad, and Muhammad Yasir Khan. "'Good Politicians': Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance." *Review of Economic Studies* (2023): *Forthcoming*.

4. Asher, Sam, and Paul Novosad. "Rent-seeking and criminal politicians: Evidence from mining booms." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 105.1 (2023): 20-39.

5. Cruz, Cesi, Julien Labonne, and Pablo Querubin. "Politician family networks and electoral outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines." *American Economic Review* 107.10 (2017): 3006-3037.

6. Casey, Katherine, Abou Bakarr Kamara, and Niccoló F. Meriggi. "An Experiment in Candidate Selection." *American Economic Review* 111.5 (2021): 1575-1612.

Models:

- Caselli, Francesco, and Massimo Morelli. "Bad politicians." *Journal of Public Economics* 88.3-4 (2004): 759-782.

- Mattozzi, Andrea, and Antonio Merlo. "Political careers or career politicians?." *Journal of Public Economics* 92.3-4 (2008): 597-608.

- Galasso, Vincenzo, and Tommaso Nannicini. "Competing on Good Politicians." *American Political Science Review* 105.1 (2011): 79-99.

Remuneration:

- Besley, Timothy. "Paying politicians: theory and evidence." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2.2-3 (2004): 193-215.

- Messner, Matthias, and Mattias K. Polborn. "Paying Politicians." *Journal of Public Economics* 88.12 (2004): 2423-2445.

- Gagliarducci, Stefano, Tommaso Nannicini, and Paolo Naticchioni. "Moonlighting Politicians." *Journal of Public Economics* 94.9-10 (2010): 688-699.

- Gagliarducci, Stefano, and Tommaso Nannicini. "Do better paid politicians perform better? Disentangling incentives from selection." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11.2 (2013): 369-398.

Rents and political entry

- Brollo, Fernanda, Tommaso Nannicini, Roberto Perotti, and Guido Tabellini. "The Political Resource Curse." *American Economic Review* 103.5 (2013): 1759-1796.

- Bandiera, Antonella. "The Effect of Rents on Behavior: Evidence from Illegal Gold Mining in Peru." *Unpublished manuscript* (2022).

Public service motivation:

- Ravanilla, Nico. "Mitigating Adverse Political Selection: Experimental Evidence from a Leadership Training for Aspiring Politicians in the Philippines." *Unpublished manuscript* (2021).

Institutional determinants of political selection:

- Arora, Ashna. "Election by community consensus: Effects on political selection and governance." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 104.2 (2022): 321-335.

- Grossman, Guy. "Do Selection Rules Affect Leader Responsiveness? Evidence from Rural Uganda." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 9.1 (2014): 1-44.

Political selection in autocracies:

- Truex, Rory. "The returns to office in a "rubber stamp" parliament." *American Political Science Review* 108.2 (2014): 235-251.

- Jia, Ruixue, Masayuki Kudamatsu, and David Seim. "Political Selection in China: The Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 13.4 (2015): 631-668.

- Weghorst, Keith. *Activist Origins of Political Ambition: Opposition Candidacy in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes*. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2022.

Useful reviews:

- Dal Bó, Ernesto, and Frederico Finan. "Progress and perspectives in the study of political selection." *Annual Review of Economics* 10 (2018): 541-575.

- Gulzar, Saad. "Who Enters Politics and Why?." *Annual Review of Political Science* 24 (2021): 253-275.

No class on March 28th

4.10   Political oversight of the bureaucracy (4/4)

Learning objectives:

- When do politicians prioritize meritocratic recruitment over patronage hiring?

- How do attributes of the personnel system affect the delivery of public services?

- Incentivizing civil servants (beyong personnel system).

- Politicians' ability and will to provide bureaucratic oversight.

Required readings:

1. Brierley, Sarah. "Combining Patronage and Merit in Public Sector Recruitment." *The Journal of Politics* 83.1 (2021): 182-197.

2. Colonnelli, Emanuele, Mounu Prem, and Edoardo Teso. "Patronage and selection in public sector organizations." *American Economic Review* 110.10 (2020): 3071-3099.

3. Akhtari, Mitra, Diana Moreira, and Laura Trucco. "Political turnover, bureaucratic turnover, and the quality of public services." *American Economic Review* 112.2 (2022): 442-493.

4. Toral, Guillermo. "How patronage delivers: Political appointments, bureaucratic accountability, and service delivery in Brazil." *American Journal of Political Science* (2022) *First View.*

5. Raffler, Pia J. "Does political oversight of the bureaucracy increase accountability? Field experimental evidence from a dominant party regime." *American Political Science Review* 116.4 (2022): 1443-1459.

6. Gulzar, Saad, and Pasquale, Benjamin J. "Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India." *American Political Science Review* 111.1 (2017): 162-183.

Patronage and collusion:

- Brierley, Sarah. "Unprincipled principals: Co-opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana." *American Journal of Political Science* 64.2 (2020): 209-222.

- Oliveros, Virginia. *Patronage at Work: Public Jobs and Political Services in Argentina.* Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Oversight:

- Ting, Michael M. "Politics and administration." *American Journal of Political Science* 61.2 (2017): 305-319.

- Olken, Benjamin A. "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. *Journal of Political Economy* 115.2 (2007): 200-249.

- Callen, Michael, Saad Gulzar, Ali Hasanain, Muhammad Yasir Khan, and Arman Rezaee. "Data and Policy Decisions: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan." *Journal of Development Economics* 146 (2020): 102523.

- Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, Nicholas Y. Li, and Laura Schechter. "Information technology and government decentralization: Experimental evidence from paraguay." *Econometrica* 89.2 (2021): 677-701.

- Auerbach, Adam, Tariq Thachil, and Shikhar Singh. "Who Knows How to Govern? Procedural Knowledge in India's Small Town Councils." *American Political Science Review* (2023).

Autonomy:

- Evans, Peter. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

- Rasul, Imran, and Daniel Rogger. . "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service. *The Economic Journal* 128.608 (2017): 413-446.

- Bandiera, Oriana, Michael Carlos Best, Adnan Qadir Khan, and Andrea Prat. "The allocation of authority in organizations: A field experiment with bureaucrats." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 136.4 (2021): 2195-2242.

Incentives:

- Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, and B. Kelsey Jack "No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery." *Journal of Public Economics* 120 (2014): 1-17.

- Dal Bo, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, and Martín A. Rossi. "Strengthening state capabilities: The role of financial incentives in the call to public service." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128.3 (2013): 1169-1218.

- Khan, Adnan Q., Asim I. Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken. . "Tax farming redux: Experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 131.1 (2015): 219-271.

- Khan, Adnan Q., Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken. "Making moves matter: Experimental evidence on incentivizing bureaucrats through performance-based postings." *American Economic Review* 109.1 (2019): 237-270.

- Leaver, Clare, Owen Ozier, Pieter Serneels, and Andrew Zeitlin. "Recruitment, effort, and retention effects of performance contracts for civil servants: Experimental evidence from Rwandan primary schools." *American Economic Review* 111.7 (2021): 2213-2246.

Useful reviews:

- Besley, Timothy, Robin Burgess, Adnan Khan, and Guo Xu. "Bureaucracy and development." *Annual Review of Economics* 14 (2022): 397-424.

- Brierley, Sarah, Kenneth Lowande, Rachel Augustine Potter, and Guillermo Toral. "Bureaucratic Politics: Blind Spots and Opportunities in Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science* 26 (2023): 271-290.

- Bersch, Katherine, and Francis Fukuyama. "Defining Bureaucratic Autonomy." *Annual Review of Political Science* 26 (2023): 213-232.

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

4.11   Bureaucrats and Citizen (4/11)

Learning objectives:

- When do bureaucrats internalize citizen welfare?

    - Bureaucratic embeddedness

- Access inequality to public services

- Community monitoring of frontline service providers

Require readings:

1. Xu, Guo. "Bureaucratic representation and state responsiveness during times of crisis: The 1918 pandemic in india." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 105.2 (2023): 482-491.

2. Xu, Guo, Marianne Bertrand, and Robin Burgess. "Organization of the state: home assignment and bureaucrat performance." *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 39.2 (2023): 371-419.

3. Slough, Tara. "Squeaky Wheels and Inequality in Bureaucratic Service Provision." *Unpublished manuscript* (2022).

4. Christensen, Darin, Oeindrila Dube, Johannes Haushofer, Bilal Siddiqi, and Maarten Voors. "Building resilient health systems: Experimental evidence from Sierra Leone and the 2014 Ebola outbreak." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 136.2 (2021): 1145-1198.

5. Raffler, Pia, Daniel N. Posner, and Doug Parkerson. "Can Citizen Pressure be Induced to Improve Public Service Provision?" *Unpublished manuscript* (2022).

Bureaucratic embeddedness

- Bhavnani, Rikhil R., and Alexander Lee. "Local embeddedness and bureaucratic performance: evidence from India." *The Journal of Politics* 80.1 (2018): 71-87.

- Haveman, Heather A., Nan Jia, Jing Shi, and Yongxiang Wang. "The dynamics of political embeddedness in China." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 62.1 (2017): 67-104.

- Hassan, Mai. *Regime threats and state solutions: Bureaucratic loyalty and embeddedness in Kenya.* Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Community monitoring

- Björkman, Martina, and Jakob Svensson. "Power to the people: evidence from a randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring in Uganda." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124.2 (2009): 735-769.

- Björkman Nyqvist, Martina, Damien De Walque, & Jakob Svensson. (2017). "Experimental evidence on the long-run impact of community-based monitoring." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 9(1): 33-69.

25/26

- Banerjee, Abhijit V., Rukmini Banerji, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Stuti Khemani. "Pitfalls of participatory programs: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in education in India." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 2.1 (2010): 1-30.

- Andrabi, Tahir, Jishnu Das, and Asim Ijaz Khwaja. "Report cards: The impact of providing school and child test scores on educational markets." *American Economic Review* 107.6 (2017): 1535-1563.

- Slough, Tara, et al. "Adoption of community monitoring improves common pool resource management across contexts." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118.29 (2021): e2015367118.

- Burde, Dana, Joel Middleton, Roxanne Rahnama, and Cyrus Samii. "Can Communities Take Charge?." *Unpublished manuscript* (2023).

Community driven development

- Humphreys, Macartan, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, and Peter Van der Windt. "Exporting democratic practices: Evidence from a village governance intervention in Eastern Congo." *Journal of Development Economics* 140 (2019): 279-301.

- Samii, Cyrus. "Revisiting community-driven reconstruction in fragile states." *UNU-WIDER Working Paper Series* (2023).

Reviews

- Pepinsky, Thomas B., Jan H. Pierskalla, & Audrey Sacks. "Bureaucracy and Service Delivery." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20 (2017): 249-268.

4.12   Three actors: the pathe forward (4/18)

Learning objectives:

- The benefit of incorporating politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens in a single framework

    - illuminate new mechanisms underlying (un)responsive governance
    - reconcile conflicting findings in the extant literature

Require readings:

1. Martin, Lucy, and Pia J. Raffler. "Fault lines: the effects of bureaucratic power on electoral accountability." *American Journal of Political Science* 65.1 (2021): 210-224.

2. Slough, Tara. "Bureaucratic Quality and Electoral Accountability." *American Political Science Review* (2023). *Forthcoming*.

3. Slough, Tara. "Oversight, Capacity, and Inequality" *Unpublished manuscript* (2022).

4. Grossman, Guy, and Tara Slough. "Government responsiveness in developing countries." *Annual Review of Political Science* 25 (2022): 131-153.

Models

- Ting, Michael M. "The Political Economy of Governance Quality." *American Political Science Review* 115.2 (2021): 667-685.

- Foarta, Dana. "How organizational capacity can improve electoral accountability." *American Journal of Political Science* 67.3 (2023): 776-789.

- Li, Christopher, Greg Sasso, and Ian R. Turner. "Hierarchical Control". *Unpublished manuscript* (2023).

4.13 Students presentations (4/25)