Supplementary Information for "Can low-cost, scalable, online intervention increase youth informed political participation in electoral authoritarian contexts?"

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Contents

A Cross-country comparisons: Figure 1 **3**

B Study design **3**
B.1 Study flow . . . 3
B.2 Material . . . 4
B.2.1 Treatments and moderators . . . 4
B.2.2 Outcomes . . . 8

C Additional descriptive statistics **10**
C.1 Sample, attrition, and treatment compliance . . . 10
C.2 Moderators . . . 11
C.2.1 Prior turnout intention . . . 11
C.2.2 Party-policy congruence . . . 12

D Main results **13**

E Robustness checks **18**
E.1 Trinary moderator specification . . . 18
E.2 Attrition . . . 19
E.2.1 Differential attrition . . . 19
E.2.2 Inverse probability weighted estimates . . . 19
E.3 Moderator importance . . . 22

F Pre-registered tests **23**

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List of Tables

1 Surveys considered in the construction of Figure 1 . . . 3
2 Transcript of the video used in the *civics treatment* . . . 4
3 Computing policy distance . . . 7
4 Descriptive statistics . . . 10
5 Descriptive statistics, by prior turnout intention . . . 12
6 Descriptive statistics, by congruence . . . 13
7 ATE on turnout . . . 13
8 ATE on turnout, by prior turnout intention . . . 14
9 ATE on party preferences, by congruence . . . 16
10 ATE on political knowledge . . . 17
11 ATE on turnout, trinary moderator . . . 18
12 IPW ATE on turnout . . . 20
13 IPW ATE on party preferences . . . 21
14 PAP - Hypothesis 1 . . . 24
15 PAP - Hypothesis 2.a . . . 24
16 PAP - Hypothesis 2.b, discrete shock . . . 24
17 PAP - Hypothesis 2.b, continuous shock . . . 25
18 PAP - Hypothesis 3.a . . . 25
19 PAP - Hypothesis 3.b, discrete shock . . . 26
20 PAP - Hypothesis 3.b, continuous shock . . . 27
21 PAP - Hypothesis 4.a . . . 27
22 PAP - Hypothesis 4.b, discrete shock . . . 27
23 PAP - Hypothesis 4.b, continuous shock . . . 28
24 PAP - Hypothesis 5 . . . 29

List of Figures

1 Structure of pre- and post-election surveys . . . 4
2 Screenshots of the policy preference questions and results page revealed by the *distance treatment* . . . 8
3 Distribution of prior relative preference . . . 11
4 Distribution of time spent on treatments . . . 11
5 Distribution of prior turnout intention . . . 11
6 Distribution of party-policy congruence. . . . 12
7 Effect of treatment assignment on the probability of attrition . . . 19
8 Moderator importance on turnout intention . . . 22
9 Moderator importance on party preferences . . . 23

This document provides supplementary information for the manuscript "Can low-cost, scalable, online intervention increase youth informed political participation in electoral authoritarian contexts?". In section A, we provide additional information on the construction of our motivating Figure 1. In section A, we then provide further information on the study design and materials used to measure the main quantities of interest. In section C, we provide descriptive statistics about our sample, as well as subsamples of interest. In section D, we report the statistical models underlying our main results. In section E, we report a series of tests we conducted to assess the robustness of our results. Finally, section F reports the tests pre-registered in Ferrali, Grossman and Larreguy (2021).

A Cross-country comparisons: Figure 1

This Figure reports estimated youth (18-34 years old) and adult (35+ years old) turnout during the last general election for which sufficiently high quality data was available. We considered a large set of nationally representative surveys (628 surveys, for a total of more than 1m respondents) that featured the question "Did you vote in the election [the most recent national election, parliamentary or presidential] held in [year]?". Those surveys are enumerated in the table below:

Survey	Waves	Years	Initial N	Final N
AfroBarometer	1 to 7	1999 - 2018	250,287 (170)	57,454 (43)
Americas Barometer (LAPOP)	1 to 8	2004 - 2019	231,354 (135)	48,749 (28)
Arab Barometer	1 to 5	2006 - 2019	69,431 (47)	24,336 (15)
Asian Barometer	1 to 5	2001 - 2019	93,013 (61)	19,249 (12)
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)	1 to 5	1996 - 2021	357,206 (215)	84,058 (51)
Total	-	-	1,001,291 (628)	233,846 (149)

Table 1: Surveys considered in the construction of Figure 1. The columns "Initial N" and "Final N" indicate the number of respondents and number of nationally representative surveys (in parenthesis) considered initially and after the data filtering process, respectively.

Compiling these sources obtained a list of country surveys. Among this list, we first discarded those surveys for which there was uncertainty about the election year (e.g., when the survey partially overlaps with an election). We then discarded those respondents that were 17 years old or less during election year. We then pooled surveys covering the same election, and only considered those elections which featured (1) at least 250 responses for both youth and adults, and (2) overall non-response rates smaller than 10%. For each country-election, we derived youth and adult turnout rates for each survey using the available survey weights, and pooled the resulting survey estimates weighting them by the resulting sample sizes. The procedure left us with 149 surveys, representing 233,846 respondents, covering 116 elections.

Finally, classification into democracies and non-democracies is based on Polity V scores. We classify as democracies those countries whose Polity V score is above 5 during election year.

B Study design

B.1 Study flow

Figure 1 below summarizes the flow of the survey experiment, including treatment manipulations.



Figure 1: **Structure of pre- and post-election surveys.** Our main results use data collected at "prior" and "policy preferences" to construct moderators, and outcomes measured at "posterior 2" and "quiz 1" (short-run outcomes) and "posterior 3" (long-run outcomes).

B.2 Material

B.2.1 Treatments and moderators

Table 2: Transcript of the video used in the *civics treatment*

English	Moroccan Arabic
On September 8, Morocco will hold three elections: legislative elections, regional elections, and communal elections.	فنهار 8 شتنبر غادي تدوز في المغرب تلاتا ديال الانتخابات الانتخابات التشريعية ، الإنتخابات الجهوية و الانتخابات الجماعية
During legislative elections, we choose, as Moroccan citizens, our representatives in Parliament, which will determine who will be the Head of Government, who is, as of today, Saadedine El Othmani.	فالانتخابات التشريعية كنختارو كمواطنين مغاربة النواب ديالنا في البرلمان و هادشي كيمكن من تحديد شكون غيكون رئيس الحكومة اللي هو حاليا سعد الدين العتماني.

MPs are those who make laws, monitor government activity, and evaluate public policies. Alongside with the government, they can also increase or reduce taxes, and decide upon the priorities (health, education, safety, etc.)	النواب البرلمانيون هما اللي كيوضعو القوانين ، كيراقبوا عمل الحكومة و كيديرو التقييم ديال السياسات العامة وتمكن لهم كدلك ، إلى جانب الحكومة ، على سبيل المثال : يزيدو فالضرائب أو يخفضوها ولا يقررو الأولويات (الصحة ، والتعليم ، والأمن ، وما إلى ذلك)
During regional elections, we elect our representatives in the regional council.	الإنتخابات الجهوية هي اللي كنتخبو فيها الممتلين ديالنا في المجلس الجهوي
This body has important prerogatives, such as organizing transportation between cities, business support, and laying out tracks in rural areas, etc.	هاد الهيئة عندها صلاحيات مهمة بحال تنضيم النقل بين المدن دعم الشركات وإنجاز المسارات في المناطق القروية إلى آخره.
There are also communal elections, during which we choose our representatives in the communal council, which also determines who will be elected president of the commune – who is sometimes called the mayor.	و الانتخابات الجماعية، لي كنختارو فيها الممثلين ديالنا في المجلس الجماعي، واللي كيمكن أيضا من انتخاب رئيس الجماعة اللي كيتسما فبعض الأحيان العمدة
Those are the representatives that are the closest to us. Their role is to manage our day-to-day public services: trash, markets, roads, water and electricity distribution, etc.	وهادو هما المنتخبين لي كيكونو قراب لينا كتر. كيتكلفو بتدبير المصالح العامة اليومية ديالنا : النفايات والأسواق والطرق وتوزيع المياه والكهرباء ، إلخ.
Every Moroccan citizen aged 18 or more has the right to vote in these elections.	كل مواطن مغربي تجاوز سن ديال 18 سنة عندو الحق في التصويت في كل من هذه الانتخابات.
In order to vote, I must be registered on the voter file, which will register me with a polling station.	باش نصوت خاصني نكون مسجل فاللوائح الانتخابية و بالتالي كنكون مسجل فمكتب التصويت.

On election day, I'll have to go to this polling station and bring my national ID. To find whether I'm registered and what is my polling station, I can send my national ID number to 2727, which is a phone service provided by the Ministry of Interior. I can also visit the website listeselectorales.ma	نهار التصويت خاصني نمشي لمكتب التصويت لي مسجل فيه و ندي معايا بطاقة التعريف الوطنية ديالي. باش نتأكد واش انا مسجل و فإينا مكتب التصويت نبعت رقم بطاقة التعريف الوطنية ديالي إلى ٢٧٢٧ ولي هي خدمة الهاتف التابعة لوزارة الداخلية ولا ندخل لموقع listeselectorales.ma
When I'll get to the polling station, the people in charge will explain to me how to vote. That's why I'll have to pay close attention so as to not make a mistake. Any mistake can make it so that my vote won't count.	مني غادي نوصل لمكتب التصويت، الناس لمكلفين غادي يشرحو لي طريقة التصويت ،هادشي علاش خصني نرد لبال مزيان باش منغلطش. أي غلط يقد يخلي ان التصويت ديالي مايتحسبش
Why not take a little bit of time to go vote? That's my chance to choose who will govern the country, the region, or the city.	علاش مناخدش شوية دلوقت ونمشي نصوت ؟ هادي هي لفرصة باش نختار شكون غادي يسير البلاد ولاالجهةولا لمدينة
Voting is also our occasion to think about what happened in the previous period and to discuss what we want for our Morocco.	التصويت هو أيضا فرصة باش نفكرو ف اشنو طرى فالفترة لي دازت وناقشوا شنو بغينا للمغرب ديالنا
So, let's go vote on September 8?	إذن ، غادي نصوتو يوم 8 شتنبر ؟

	Parties						Sample	
Question	PAM	PI	PJD	PPS	RNI	USFP	Answer	Importance
Would you support allowing extramarital sexual relationships?	1	-1	-1	1	1	0	-0.290	0.816
Would you support that men and women be equal regarding inheritance?	1	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-0.372	0.816
As part of a tax reform, would you support that more Moroccans pay taxes?	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	-0.273	0.818
Would you support protectionist measures, such as increased tariffs to protect our domestic production, but also raise the price of imported goods?	1	-1	-1	1	-1	0	0.038	0.793
Would you support stopping subsidizing first necessity goods, such as gas cylinders?	-1	1	-1	-1	1	1	-0.431	0.835
Would you support that the state further encourages the development of private education and health?	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	0.082	0.849

Table 3: **Computing policy distance.** Columns refer to the parties used in the study. 1, -1, 0 indicate, respectively, the answers "Yes," "No," and "Maybe." Morocco counts 8 major parties (the 6 featured in the above table, as well as MP and UC). Party answers were collected from circulating a questionnaire containing 25 questions to the leadership of all 8 parties. Tafra completed missing data with available press statements. MP and UC were excluded from the analysis because not enough data could be found. From the remaining 6 parties, we removed questions with missing data, and questions whose answer was consensual (i.e., all parties gave the same answer). The procedure left the above 6 questions. We compute the policy distance $D_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ between respondent i and party j by computing the percentage $P_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ of policy preference questions for which i and j gave the same answer, among the questions that i found important. If i finds no question to be important, then we consider all questions asked to i. Policy distance is then $D_{ij} = 1 - P_{ij}$. Importantly, P_{ij} and D_{ij} are defined for all participants irrespective of treatment assignment. The *distance treatment* simply reveals P_{ij} to participants (see Figure 2 for a screenshot).



(a) Example policy preference question (mobile view)

(b) Results page revealed by the *distance treatment* (desktop view)

Figure 2: Screenshots of the policy preference questions and results page revealed by the *distance treatment*

B.2.2 Outcomes

- Short-run outcomes (measured in the pre-election survey):
  - Turnout intention: measured using the following 5-points Likert scale, recoded to fall in the $[0, 1]$ range: "How likely is it that you will turn out to vote in the election that will be held on September 8 2021?" [Definitely not $= 0$ / Probably not / Not sure / Probably yes / Definitely yes $= 1$]
  - Level of support for one's favorite party: with $P_i^1, P_i^2 \in [0, 1]$ the level of support for i's favorite and second-favorite party respectively, we examine *absolute* support for one's favorite party P_i^1 as well as support *relative* to their second favorite party, $P_i^1 - P_i^2$. We measure support using the following 5-points Likert scale: "How close do you feel to those parties?" [List of participant's top two parties] [Very far $= 0$ / Somewhat far / Neither close nor far / Somewhat close / Very close $= 1$]
  - Political knowledge: measured as the number of correct answers to an incentivized quiz comprising 3 questions (see Quiz 1, Quiz 2 in Figure 1). The quiz picks 3 questions among the policy preferences (see Table 3) questions that the participant found to be important, and asks for the answer that one of the participant's favorite

two parties gave to the question. Questions are selected at random and, in the event that the participant chose fewer than three questions to be important, completed with questions the participant found unimportant. Parties are picked such that the participant's first favorite party appears twice, and their second favorite party appears once. This variable ranges from 0 to 3. Respondents earn one lottery ticket per correct answer. The lottery prize is a $10 gift card.

- Long-run outcomes (measured in the post-election survey):
  - Turnout: measured using the following question: "Did you turn out to vote in the elections that were held on September 8, 2021?" [No = 0 / Yes = 1]. The measure equals 0 for those participants who were not registered to vote. We also construct a measured of "inferred turnout," in which we use turnout intention (measured as in the pre-election survey) instead of turnout for those participants who were not registered to vote.
  - Vote choice: measured using the following question: "Please remember that this is an academic study. Your answers are anonymous and we will not share them with anyone. Which of the following parties did you vote for in the legislative election?" [Party of Justice and Development / Party Authenticity and Modernity / Istiqlal Party / National Gathering of Independents / Popular Movement / Socialist Union of Popular Forces / Party of Progress and Socialism / Constitutional Union / Other party / I cast a blank ballot / I would rather not say]. We recode participants' responses into a series of binary variables. The first such variable equals 1 if the respondent voted for their (pre-treatment) favorite party, and 0 otherwise; including if the respondent did not turn out to vote ("sharp" vote choice). Another version ("imputed" vote choice) uses the answer to the question "Had you voted in the legislative election, which of the following parties you would you have voted for?" in case the respondent did not turn out to vote. We further construct similar variables using participants' (pre-treatment) second favorite party instead of their first favorite party.
  - Political knowledge: measured as in the pre-election survey, and implemented with the same incentives.

C Additional descriptive statistics

C.1 Sample, attrition, and treatment compliance

Variable	Sample	Population	Attriters	Non-attriters	Δ
Socio-demographics					
Age	24.508	-	24.503	24.557	0.053
% female	0.253	0.506	0.254	0.239	-0.015
% higher education	0.614	0.122	0.608	0.669	0.061***
% urban	0.672	0.611	0.668	0.703	0.034*
% Arabic	0.771	0.991	0.786	0.628	-0.157***
% single	0.787	0.563	0.784	0.808	0.023
% student	0.393	0.133	0.390	0.426	0.036*
% employed	0.233	0.407	0.233	0.229	-0.005
% IAM	0.518	-	0.512	0.576	0.065***
Politics					
Interest in politics[a]	0.479	0.710	0.478	0.485	0.007
% voted in 2016[a]	0.331	0.248	0.327	0.365	0.037**
% registered[b]	0.562	0.473	0.551	0.642	0.091***
Turnout intention (prior)	0.742	-	0.744	0.714	-0.030**
Attachment to party 1 (prior)	0.605	-	0.605	0.604	-0.002
% PJD supporters	0.321	-	0.323	0.302	-0.022
% RNI supporters	0.274	-	0.269	0.320	0.051***
Design					
Time spent on civics treatment	29.905	-	29.877	30.294	0.416
% compliers to civics treatment	0.164	-	0.163	0.182	0.019
Time spent on distance treatment	26.154	-	26.175	25.828	-0.347
% round 1 participants	0.480	-	0.465	0.623	0.158***
N	7650.000	-	6937.000	713.000	-

Note:
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
[a] Population data: Arab Barometer wave 5 (2018)
[b] Among round 1 participants only. Population data: Ministry of Interior (2021)

Table 4: **Descriptive statistics.** This table reports sample means for the whole sample ("Sample" column), as well as for attriters (i.e., respondents who did not participate in wave 2), and non-attriters (i.e., respondents who participated in wave 2). The "Population" column refers to population estimates. Those are derived from the 2014 census, unless otherwise mentioned. The Δ column reports the difference between attriters and non-attriters; p-values are robust. The variable % Arabic refers to the percentage of respondents that took the survey in Arabic. The variable % IAM refers to the percentage of respondents that use Itissalat Al Maghrib as their phone operator. The variables "Interest in politics", "Turnout intention (Prior)", "Attachment to party 1 (Prior)" are measured on a 0-1 scale, with 1 referring to the high modality. The variables "% PJD supporters" and "% RNI supporters" refer, respectively, to the share of respondents having chosen Party of Justice and Development, and National Gathering of Independents as their favorite party. The variable "% compliers to *civics treatment*" refers to the share of participants that have spent more than 60 seconds watching the civic education video.



Figure 3: **Distribution of prior relative preference.** This figure plots the distribution of participants' support for their favorite party relative to their second favorite party ($P_i^1 - P_i^2$), by level of party-policy congruence. For all three levels of party-policy congruence, the bulk of participants have at most a weak preference for their favorite party (more than 60% of the mass in $[0, .25]$).



Figure 4: **Distribution of time spent on treatments.** Colored lines are sample medians. The dotted line is the video's duration (2:09m). We report data from participants in rounds 2 and 3 only. Time spent on treatment was not recorded for round 1 and, hence for the *registration treatment*. The median participant did not watch the civic education video (median time = 7s $<$ 2:09m). The median participant spent 16 sec on the *distance treatment*.

C.2 Moderators

C.2.1 Prior turnout intention



Figure 5: **Distribution of prior turnout intention.** This figure provides a graphical representation of possible answers to the question: "How likely is it that you will turn out to vote in the election that will be held on September 8 2021?". 48% participants are likely conditional voters.

Variable	Prior turnout intention			Differences	
	Uncond. non-voters	Cond. voters	Uncond. voters	Δ (Cond. voters)	Δ (Uncond. voters)
Socio-demographics					
Age	25.564	24.262	24.574	-1.302***	-0.990***
% female	0.200	0.271	0.243	0.071***	0.043**
% higher education	0.635	0.619	0.606	-0.016	-0.029
% urban	0.707	0.689	0.648	-0.018	-0.059***
% Arabic	0.737	0.734	0.814	-0.003	0.077***
% single	0.779	0.811	0.764	0.032*	-0.014
% student	0.339	0.410	0.385	0.071***	0.046**
% employed	0.281	0.206	0.251	-0.075***	-0.030
% IAM	0.498	0.526	0.513	0.029	0.015
Politics					
Interest in politics[a]	0.347	0.390	0.589	0.044***	0.242***
% voted in 2016[a]	0.316	0.252	0.412	-0.064***	0.096***
% registered[b]	0.362	0.418	0.780	0.056**	0.418***
Turnout intention (prior)	0.000	0.609	1.000	0.609***	1.000***
Attachment to party 1 (prior)	0.343	0.534	0.714	0.191***	0.371***
% PJD supporters	0.328	0.338	0.303	0.011	-0.025
% RNI supporters	0.201	0.271	0.288	0.070***	0.087***
Design					
Time spent on civics treatment	27.395	29.169	30.828	1.774	3.433
% compliers to civics treatment	0.120	0.161	0.172	0.042*	0.052**
Time spent on distance treatment	30.262	27.684	24.363	-2.579	-5.900*
% round 1 participants	0.611	0.509	0.429	-0.102***	-0.182***
N	601.000	3519.000	3530.000	-	-

Note:
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.

Table 5: **Descriptive statistics, by prior turnout intention.** This Table uses the same conventions as Table 4 but breaks the sample down as a function of their prior turnout intention. The Δ columns compare the column in parenthesis to the "Unconditional non-voters" column.

C.2.2 Party-policy congruence



Figure 6: Distribution of party-policy congruence.

Variable	Party-policy congruence			Differences	
	Congruent	Small discrepancy	Large discrepancy	Δ (small)	Δ (large)
Socio-demographics					
Age	24.524	24.314	24.608	-0.210	0.084
% female	0.268	0.242	0.245	-0.026**	-0.023**
% higher education	0.630	0.599	0.608	-0.031**	-0.022*
% urban	0.686	0.669	0.660	-0.018	-0.026**
% Arabic	0.784	0.776	0.756	-0.008	-0.028**
% single	0.775	0.809	0.784	0.034***	0.009
% student	0.398	0.411	0.378	0.014	-0.019
% employed	0.225	0.239	0.236	0.014	0.011
% IAM	0.518	0.533	0.509	0.015	-0.009
Politics					
Interest in politics[a]	0.474	0.478	0.484	0.004	0.010
% voted in 2016[a]	0.329	0.326	0.335	-0.004	0.006
% registered[b]	0.528	0.571	0.585	0.043*	0.057***
Turnout intention (prior)	0.739	0.742	0.743	0.002	0.004
Attachment to party 1 (prior)	0.611	0.596	0.605	-0.015	-0.007
% PJD supporters	0.537	0.214	0.190	-0.323***	-0.347***
% RNI supporters	0.131	0.367	0.347	0.236***	0.216***
Design					
Time spent on civics treatment	30.007	30.504	29.443	0.497	-0.563
% compliers to civics treatment	0.164	0.166	0.163	0.002	-0.001
Time spent on distance treatment	23.571	27.726	27.669	4.155**	4.098***
% round 1 participants	0.464	0.474	0.498	0.010	0.034***
N	2768.000	1797.000	3085.000	-	-

Note:
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.

Table 6: **Descriptive statistics, by congruence between party preferences and policy preferences.** This Table uses the same conventions as Table 4 but breaks the sample down as a function of their congruence. The Δ columns compare the column in parenthesis to the "Congruent" column.

D Main results

	Pre-election		Post-election	
	All	Non-attriters	Turnout	Inferred turnout
registration	−0.007	−0.015	−0.035	−0.013
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.046)	(0.041)
civics	0.007	−0.019	0.022	0.021
	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.060)	(0.060)
distance	0.002	−0.023	−0.040	−0.016
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Num.Obs.	7650	713	712	712
R2	0.657	0.746	0.365	0.283
Mean DV (Control)	0.754	0.765	0.672	0.743
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

Table 7: **Average treatment effects on turnout.** This table reports OLS estimates corresponding to the model in equation 1. All models include stratum fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. See section B.2.2 for a definition of outcomes. The model in column 1 is used to construct Figure 3 in the manuscript. No treatment had a statistically significant short-run average effect on turnout (column 1). The finding also applies to non-attriters (column 2). Treatments had no significant long-term effects (columns 3 and 4). * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

	Pre-election		Post-election	
	All	Non-attriters	Turnout	Inferred turnout
registration	−0.003	−0.027	−0.038	−0.044
	(0.009)	(0.029)	(0.058)	(0.057)
civics	−0.004	−0.043	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.032)	(0.080)	(0.080)
distance	−0.006	−0.050**	−0.044	−0.021
	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.046)	(0.046)
registration × conditional	−0.009	0.029	0.009	0.070
	(0.013)	(0.039)	(0.094)	(0.083)
civics × conditional	0.027**	0.051	0.051	0.051
	(0.011)	(0.050)	(0.122)	(0.121)
distance × conditional	0.017**	0.060*	0.008	0.011
	(0.008)	(0.031)	(0.073)	(0.068)
Num.Obs.	7650	713	712	712
R2	0.657	0.748	0.365	0.284
Mean DV (Control, unconditional)	0.859	0.885	0.758	0.799
Mean DV (Control, conditional)	0.632	0.650	0.589	0.689
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
distance + distance × conditional	0.011*	0.010	-0.036	-0.009
	(0.073)	(0.614)	(0.529)	(0.856)
registration + registration × conditional	-0.012	0.002	-0.029	0.026
	(0.186)	(0.929)	(0.690)	(0.661)
civics + civics × conditional	0.023***	0.008	0.049	0.048
	(0.008)	(0.840)	(0.593)	(0.596)

Table 8: **Average treatment effects on turnout, by prior vote intention.** This table reports OLS estimates corresponding to the model in equation 2. All models include stratum fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. See section B.2.2 for a definition of outcomes. The bottom panel reports the linear combination of parameters reported in each row. The p-value associated with the corresponding F-test is reported in parentheses. The model in column 1 is used to construct Figure 3 in the manuscript. The *distance* and *registration treatments* significantly increased turnout in the short run for conditional voters only (column 1). Non-attriters show somewhat comparable patterns (column 2). Treatments had no significant long-term effects (columns 3 and 4). * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

	Pre-election				Post-election			
	Abs. pref		Rel. pref		Vote for fav.		Vote for 2nd fav.	
	All	Non attr.	All	Non attr.	Sharp	Imputed	Sharp	Imputed
registration	0.000	−0.001	0.004	−0.012	−0.034	0.013	−0.012	0.030
	(0.009)	(0.029)	(0.010)	(0.035)	(0.088)	(0.099)	(0.054)	(0.069)
civics	0.019**	0.094**	0.007	0.023	0.094	0.094	0.047	0.023
	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.011)	(0.056)	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.084)	(0.092)
distance	0.006	0.056**	0.005	0.050	−0.044	0.006	−0.065	−0.048
	(0.007)	(0.026)	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.045)	(0.055)
small discrepancy	−0.013	0.051	−0.013	0.042	0.229**	0.257**	−0.049	−0.026
	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.011)	(0.036)	(0.107)	(0.112)	(0.061)	(0.073)
large discrepancy	−0.005	0.051*	−0.007	0.018	0.103	0.189**	0.029	0.064
	(0.009)	(0.029)	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.058)	(0.071)
distance × small discrepancy	−0.026**	−0.085*	−0.062***	−0.183***	−0.171	−0.267**	0.195***	0.205**
	(0.012)	(0.048)	(0.014)	(0.056)	(0.119)	(0.127)	(0.075)	(0.087)
distance × large discrepancy	−0.033***	−0.091**	−0.013	−0.043	−0.051	−0.106	0.048	0.021
	(0.011)	(0.037)	(0.012)	(0.046)	(0.097)	(0.107)	(0.067)	(0.082)
registration × small discrepancy	0.018	0.056	0.003	0.022	0.073	0.046	0.028	−0.008
	(0.015)	(0.053)	(0.018)	(0.058)	(0.137)	(0.145)	(0.092)	(0.103)
registration × large discrepancy	0.007	−0.031	0.014	0.036	−0.033	−0.208*	0.091	0.059
	(0.013)	(0.043)	(0.014)	(0.051)	(0.113)	(0.123)	(0.082)	(0.099)
civics × small discrepancy	−0.034**	−0.134**	−0.033*	−0.143*	−0.261*	−0.165	−0.145	−0.139
	(0.015)	(0.061)	(0.017)	(0.086)	(0.157)	(0.182)	(0.113)	(0.128)
civics × large discrepancy	−0.017	−0.145***	−0.017	−0.066	−0.138	−0.220	−0.076	0.003
	(0.013)	(0.051)	(0.015)	(0.061)	(0.127)	(0.138)	(0.105)	(0.119)
prior	−0.063***	−0.076	0.686***	0.668***	0.029	0.052	−0.117*	−0.051
	(0.012)	(0.050)	(0.017)	(0.068)	(0.096)	(0.105)	(0.060)	(0.073)
Num.Obs.	6949	642	6881	637	561	561	561	561
R2	0.636	0.685	0.443	0.559	0.276	0.233	0.206	0.214
Mean DV (Control, congruent)	0.632	0.575	0.115	0.071	0.175	0.281	0.088	0.140
Mean DV (Control, small discrepancy)	0.622	0.636	0.105	0.129	0.517	0.586	0.069	0.103
Mean DV (Control, large discrepancy)	0.620	0.598	0.105	0.082	0.327	0.418	0.127	0.182
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	−1.000	−1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
distance + distance × small discrepancy	-0.020**	-0.028	-0.058***	-0.133***	-0.215**	-0.261***	0.129**	0.157**
	(0.036)	(0.478)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.024)	(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.020)
distance + distance × large discrepancy	-0.028***	-0.034	-0.008	0.007	-0.095	-0.100	-0.017	-0.027
	(0.000)	(0.232)	(0.331)	(0.813)	(0.135)	(0.145)	(0.730)	(0.644)
distance × large discrepancy - distance × small discrepancy	-0.007	-0.006	0.049***	0.140***	0.120	0.161	-0.147*	-0.183**
	(0.563)	(0.900)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.291)	(0.176)	(0.053)	(0.034)
civics + civics × small discrepancy	-0.014	-0.040	-0.026*	-0.119*	-0.167	-0.071	-0.098	-0.116
	(0.246)	(0.465)	(0.060)	(0.094)	(0.192)	(0.638)	(0.243)	(0.245)
civics + civics × large discrepancy	0.002	-0.051	-0.010	-0.042	-0.045	-0.125	-0.029	0.026
	(0.839)	(0.215)	(0.362)	(0.255)	(0.610)	(0.189)	(0.689)	(0.759)
registration + registration × small discrepancy	0.018	0.055	0.007	0.009	0.038	0.059	0.017	0.022
	(0.172)	(0.219)	(0.658)	(0.840)	(0.730)	(0.590)	(0.813)	(0.779)
registration + registration × large discrepancy	0.007	-0.032	0.018	0.023	-0.068	-0.194**	0.079	0.089
	(0.477)	(0.379)	(0.102)	(0.582)	(0.399)	(0.021)	(0.217)	(0.218)

Table 9: **Average treatment effects on party preferences, by party-policy congruence.** All models include stratum fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. See section B.2.2 for a definition of outcomes. The bottom panel reports the linear combination of parameters reported in each row. The p-value associated with the corresponding F-test is reported in parentheses. The models in columns 1, 3, 5, 7 are used to construct Figure 4 in the manuscript. The *distance treatment* decreased absolute preference for one's favorite party for those participants whose party and policy preferences were not congruent (column 1). It decreased relative preference for that party only for those participants whose party and preferences exhibited a small discrepancy (column 3). Those short-run findings also travel to non-attriters (columns 2, 4). The treatment had long-run effects: those participants whose party and preferences exhibited a small discrepancy were less likely to vote for their favorite party (columns 5, 6), and more likely to vote for their second favorite party (columns 7, 8). The *registration* and *distance treatments* had, by and large, no statistically significant effects on party preferences (models 1 to 8). * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

	Pre-election		Post election
	All	Non-attriters	Non-attriters
distance	−0.012	−0.045	−0.070
	(0.021)	(0.076)	(0.078)
Num.Obs.	7033	713	698
R2	0.033	0.173	0.187
Mean DV (Control)	1.262	1.220	1.206
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	3.000	3.000	3.000

Table 10: **Average treatment effect on political knowledge.** All models include stratum fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. See section B.2.2 for a definition of outcomes. The *distance treatment* had no statistically significant effect on political knowledge. * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

E Robustness checks

E.1 Trinary moderator specification

	Pre-election		Post-election	
	All	Non-attriters	Turnout	Inferred turnout
registration	0.021	−0.057	−0.178	−0.188
	(0.032)	(0.120)	(0.139)	(0.155)
civics	−0.011	0.346***	0.093	0.076
	(0.047)	(0.132)	(0.096)	(0.090)
distance	−0.002	−0.192*	−0.187	−0.151
	(0.026)	(0.099)	(0.122)	(0.134)
registration × conditional	−0.032	0.060	0.149	0.214
	(0.033)	(0.123)	(0.157)	(0.166)
registration × uncond. voter	−0.029	0.032	0.163	0.169
	(0.033)	(0.123)	(0.153)	(0.167)
civics × conditional	0.034	−0.338**	−0.044	−0.027
	(0.048)	(0.138)	(0.133)	(0.128)
civics × uncond. voter	0.008	−0.397***	−0.096	−0.078
	(0.048)	(0.136)	(0.126)	(0.122)
distance × conditional	0.013	0.202**	0.151	0.142
	(0.027)	(0.101)	(0.134)	(0.144)
distance × uncond. voter	−0.005	0.160	0.160	0.146
	(0.027)	(0.102)	(0.131)	(0.143)
Num.Obs.	7650	713	712	712
R2	0.657	0.752	0.367	0.287
Mean DV (Control, unconditional non-voters)	0.163	0.304	0.500	0.696
Mean DV (Control, conditional voters)	0.632	0.650	0.589	0.689
Mean DV (Control, unconditional voters)	0.970	0.990	0.805	0.818
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
distance + distance × conditional	0.011*	0.010	-0.036	-0.009
	(0.073)	(0.615)	(0.530)	(0.856)
distance + distance × uncond. voter	-0.007	-0.032	-0.027	-0.006
	(0.196)	(0.174)	(0.587)	(0.910)
registration + registration × conditional	-0.012	0.002	-0.029	0.026
	(0.187)	(0.929)	(0.691)	(0.662)
registration + registration × uncond. voter	-0.008	-0.026	-0.015	-0.020
	(0.358)	(0.309)	(0.809)	(0.749)
civics + civics × conditional	0.023***	0.008	0.049	0.048
	(0.008)	(0.841)	(0.594)	(0.597)
civics + civics × uncond. voter	-0.003	-0.051	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.615)	(0.111)	(0.973)	(0.973)

Table 11: **Average treatment effects on turnout, by prior vote intention, trinary moderator.** This table reproduces Table 8 but splits the unconditional voter category into unconditional non-voters (the reference category) and unconditional voters. Results are robust to this modification: the *distance* and *registration treatments* significantly increased turnout in the short run for conditional voters only (column 1). Non-attriters show somewhat comparable patterns (column 2). Treatments had no significant long-term effects (columns 3 and 4). * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

E.2 Attrition

E.2.1 Differential attrition



Figure 7: **Effect of treatment assignment on the probability of attrition.** We report within-stratum estimates with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors for the unconditional probability of completing the pre-election survey (black) and of participating in the post-election survey (dark gray), as well as the probability of participating in the post-election survey conditional on having completed the pre-election survey (light gray). We use the control condition as a reference category. Bars represent 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Assignment to the *registration treatment* decreased the probability of completing the pre-election survey, but had no impact on the probability of participating in the post-election survey. Assignment to the other treatments had no statistically significant impact on attrition.

E.2.2 Inverse probability weighted estimates

This section reports inverse probability weighted estimates for our long-run outcomes. Doing so, we correct for potential bias owing to attrition conditional on observables.

To obtain the sampling weights, we consider the sample of those respondents who completed the pre-election survey and model their participation into the post-election survey. Our model uses treatment assignment, as well as all available pre-treatment covariates (See Table 4 for descriptive statistics); that is:

- Age (continuous variable)
- Female (binary variable)
- Education level (categorical variable, reference category: none)
- Marital status (categorical variable, reference category: single)
- Occupation (categorical variable, reference category: student)
- Interest in politics (continuous variable)
- Pre-treatment registration status (categorical variable, reference category: don't know)
- Participation in the 2016 legislative election (binary variable)
- Prior turnout intention (continuous variable)
- Prior level of support for favorite party (continuous variable)
- Prior level of support for second favorite party (continuous variable)

- Favorite party (categorical variable, reference category: PJD)
- Second favorite party (categorical variable, reference category: PJD)
- Discrepancy (categorical variable, reference category: congruent)
- Pre-election survey round (categorical variable, reference category: round 1)

We also include all two-way interactions between those covariates. We select non-zero predictors using the LASSO algorithm, and tune the shrinkage parameter λ through 10-fold cross-validation.

	Turnout		Inferred turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
registration	−0.057	−0.081	−0.075	−0.092
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.060)
civics	−0.004	0.004	−0.005	0.003
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.082)
distance	−0.039	−0.030	0.002	0.008
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.047)
registration × conditional	0.018	0.060	0.080	0.088
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.088)	(0.093)
civics × conditional	0.032	0.002	0.033	0.002
	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.128)
distance × conditional	0.033	0.043	0.010	0.017
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.071)	(0.074)
Num.Obs.	610	610	610	610
R2	0.370	0.356	0.297	0.284
Mean DV (Control, unconditional)	0.795	0.803	0.807	0.812
Mean DV (Control, conditional)	0.603	0.613	0.699	0.706
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
IPW	_	✓	_	✓
distance + distance × conditional	-0.006	0.013	0.012	0.025
	(0.915)	(0.828)	(0.828)	(0.661)
registration + registration × conditional	-0.039	-0.021	0.005	-0.004
	(0.625)	(0.790)	(0.942)	(0.952)
civics + civics × conditional	0.028	0.006	0.028	0.006
	(0.775)	(0.952)	(0.776)	(0.952)

Table 12: **Inverse probability weighted estimates for turnout.** This table reproduces models 3 and 4 in Table 8. The IPW columns (i.e., models 2 and 4) report inverse probability weighted estimates for the sample of those respondents for which the full set of control covariates is available. We also report, for comparison, unweighted estimates (models 1 and 3). Results are similar to those of Table 8: treatments had no significant long-term effects, neither for likely conditional voters, nor for likely unconditional voters and non-voters. * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

	Vote for fav.				Vote for 2nd fav.			
	Sharp		Imputed		Sharp		Imputed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
registration	−0.006	0.006	0.046	0.088	−0.056	−0.045	−0.031	−0.012
	(0.095)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.110)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.067)	(0.064)
civics	0.104	0.106	0.083	0.096	0.050	0.041	0.016	0.023
	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.122)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.092)	(0.092)
distance	−0.063	−0.061	−0.002	−0.014	−0.048	−0.051	−0.017	−0.015
	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.057)
small discrepancy	0.225**	0.202*	0.250**	0.222*	−0.052	−0.042	−0.039	−0.021
	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.068)
large discrepancy	0.101	0.080	0.182*	0.160	0.049	0.085	0.087	0.138*
	(0.085)	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.072)	(0.072)
distance × small discrepancy	−0.135	−0.117	−0.242*	−0.210	0.160**	0.167**	0.135	0.138*
	(0.124)	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.139)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.086)	(0.083)
distance × large discrepancy	−0.012	−0.013	−0.105	−0.097	0.011	−0.012	−0.047	−0.080
	(0.102)	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.118)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.084)	(0.084)
registration × small discrepancy	0.031	0.012	0.008	−0.028	0.081	0.087	0.093	0.081
	(0.143)	(0.149)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.096)
registration × large discrepancy	−0.089	−0.084	−0.233*	−0.253*	0.134	0.102	0.138	0.094
	(0.121)	(0.126)	(0.129)	(0.132)	(0.085)	(0.080)	(0.098)	(0.094)
civics × small discrepancy	−0.286*	−0.255	−0.181	−0.148	−0.118	−0.111	−0.083	−0.094
	(0.162)	(0.172)	(0.187)	(0.196)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.127)	(0.124)
civics × large discrepancy	−0.177	−0.170	−0.250*	−0.242*	−0.065	−0.055	0.032	0.024
	(0.131)	(0.137)	(0.141)	(0.146)	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.122)	(0.123)
prior	0.012	−0.033	0.063	0.018	−0.133**	−0.136**	−0.050	−0.054
	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.111)	(0.115)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.076)	(0.075)
Num.Obs.	529	529	529	529	529	529	529	529
R2	0.275	0.285	0.236	0.246	0.213	0.232	0.230	0.241
Mean DV (Control, congruent)	0.189	0.201	0.302	0.305	0.094	0.087	0.132	0.120
Mean DV (Control, small discrepancy)	0.517	0.509	0.586	0.572	0.069	0.068	0.103	0.099
Mean DV (Control, large discrepancy)	0.360	0.357	0.460	0.451	0.140	0.162	0.200	0.219
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
IPW		✓		✓		✓		✓
distance + distance × small discrepancy	-0.198**	-0.178*	-0.244**	-0.224**	0.112*	0.116**	0.118*	0.122*
	(0.043)	(0.079)	(0.016)	(0.033)	(0.059)	(0.043)	(0.076)	(0.051)
distance + distance × large discrepancy	-0.075	-0.074	-0.107	-0.111	-0.037	-0.062	-0.064	-0.096
	(0.262)	(0.277)	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.485)	(0.255)	(0.296)	(0.118)
distance × large discrepancy - distance × small discrepancy	0.124	0.104	0.137	0.113	-0.149*	-0.178**	-0.181**	-0.218**
	(0.288)	(0.389)	(0.263)	(0.371)	(0.057)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.011)
civics + civics × small discrepancy	-0.182	-0.150	-0.098	-0.052	-0.067	-0.070	-0.067	-0.071
	(0.170)	(0.277)	(0.527)	(0.744)	(0.412)	(0.377)	(0.490)	(0.445)
civics + civics × large discrepancy	-0.073	-0.065	-0.167*	-0.146	-0.014	-0.015	0.048	0.047
	(0.425)	(0.487)	(0.086)	(0.140)	(0.853)	(0.856)	(0.587)	(0.598)
registration + registration × small discrepancy	0.025	0.018	0.054	0.060	0.025	0.042	0.062	0.069
	(0.825)	(0.879)	(0.632)	(0.601)	(0.723)	(0.540)	(0.415)	(0.335)
registration + registration × large discrepancy	-0.096	-0.078	-0.188**	-0.165*	0.078	0.057	0.107	0.082
	(0.268)	(0.380)	(0.037)	(0.072)	(0.252)	(0.388)	(0.155)	(0.257)

Table 13: **Inverse probability weighted estimates for party preferences.** This table reproduces models 4 to 8 in 9. The IPW columns (i.e., even-numbered models) report inverse probability weighted estimates for the sample of those respondents for which the full set of control covariates is available. We also report, for comparison, unweighted estimates (odd-numbered models). Results are similar to those of Table 8: in the long run, those participants whose party and preferences exhibited a small discrepancy were less likely to vote for their favorite party (columns 1 to 4), and more likely to vote for their second favorite party (columns 5 to 8). The *registration* and *distance treatments* had, by and large, no statistically significant effects on party preferences (models 1 to 8). * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

E.3 Moderator importance

In this section, we report the estimates of the causal forest approach for estimating heterogeneous treatment effects (Athey, Tibshirani and Wager, 2019). We estimate a causal forest for each of our three treatments. Since the *registration treatment* was only administered during round 1, and the *civics treatment* during rounds 2 and 3, we estimate causal forests for the *registration treatment* using only round 1 participants, and causal forests for the *civics treatment* using only rounds 2 and 3 participants. For each causal forest, we use the remaining two treatments as moderators. We also consider all available pre-treatment covariates as moderators. Section E.2.2 reports all such covariates. As compared to the LASSO approach used for deriving inverse probability weighted estimates, we amend the modelling of two ordinal variables (education and discrepancy), that we now treat as continuous variables.

The plots below report the *variable importance* of each moderator; that is, a weighted sum of the number of times each moderator was split on at each depth in the forest.



Figure 8: **Moderator importance on turnout intention.** We report the importance of a series of potential moderators for each of our three treatments on turnout intention. Prior turnout intention is the most important moderator.



Figure 9: **Moderator importance on party preferences.** We report the importance of a series of potential moderators for each of our three treatments on absolute support for one's favorite party. Discrepancy is the third-most important moderator for the *distance treatment*.

F Pre-registered tests

This section reports all the tests registered in the pre-analysis plan (Ferrali, Grossman and Larreguy, 2021). All models include stratum fixed effects, with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. All tables use the following convention to denote p-value cutoffs: * $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$. The t_1, t_2, t_3 column labels correspond, respectively, to outcomes collected during the modules "posterior 1," "posterior 2," and "posterior 3" described in the survey flow (Figure 1). For each table, we report in the caption when a model was used in the main analysis.

	Pre-election		Post-election		
	t_1	t_2	Registration	Turnout	Inferred turnout
registration	−0.004	−0.007	0.012	−0.035	−0.013
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.108)	(0.046)	(0.041)
civics	0.012**	0.007		0.022	0.021
	(0.005)	(0.006)		(0.060)	(0.060)
distance	−0.003	0.002	−0.175	−0.040	−0.016
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.109)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Num.Obs.	7650	7650	158	712	712
R2	0.738	0.657	0.394	0.365	0.283
Mean DV (Control)	0.747	0.754	0.569	0.672	0.743
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

Table 14: **Hypothesis 1.** The models in columns 2, 4, 5 correspond, respectively, to the models in columns 1, 3, 5 in Table 7.

	Pre-election	Post-election
distance	−0.012	−0.070
	(0.021)	(0.078)
Num.Obs.	7033	698
R2	0.033	0.187
Mean DV (Control)	1.262	1.206
Min. DV	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	3.000	3.000

Table 15: **Hypothesis 2.a.** The models in columns 1, 2 correspond, respectively, to the models in columns 1, 3 in Table 10.

	Abs. pref			Rel. pref			Vote for fav.	
	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_1	t_2	t_3	Sharp	Imputed
distance	0.005	0.006	0.061	0.006	0.005	0.054	−0.032	0.017
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.054)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.081)
discrepancy	0.002	−0.012**	0.119***	0.005	−0.014**	0.125**	0.117*	0.141**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.043)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.067)
distance × discrepancy	−0.004	−0.031***	−0.162**	−0.016*	−0.032***	−0.147*	−0.102	−0.167*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.067)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.099)
prior	−0.072***	−0.064***	0.090	0.754***	0.682***	0.332***	0.029	0.064
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.067)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.105)
Num.Obs.	6942	6932	649	6884	6864	637	561	561
R2	0.750	0.634	0.224	0.580	0.438	0.194	0.262	0.214
Mean DV (Control)	0.621	0.625	0.547	0.117	0.109	0.082	0.305	0.397
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	−1.000	−1.000	−1.000	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
distance + distance × discrepancy	0.002	-0.025***	-0.101***	-0.011*	-0.027***	-0.093*	-0.134**	-0.150***
	(0.732)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.052)	(0.000)	(0.057)	(0.012)	(0.009)

Table 16: Hypothesis 2.b, discrete shock

	Abs. pref			Rel. pref			Vote for fav.	
	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_1	t_2	t_3	Sharp	Imputed
distance	0.003	−0.014***	−0.050	−0.005	−0.016***	−0.052	−0.105**	−0.102**
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.046)
discrepancy	0.003	−0.007	0.200***	0.002	−0.014	0.310***	0.256***	0.353***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.063)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.089)
distance × discrepancy	−0.007	−0.051***	−0.199**	−0.016	−0.091***	−0.291**	−0.277**	−0.343***
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.096)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.130)
prior	−0.072***	−0.063***	0.094	0.754***	0.685***	0.335***	0.031	0.068
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.067)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.104)
Num.Obs.	6942	6932	649	6884	6864	637	561	561
R2	0.750	0.634	0.227	0.580	0.444	0.210	0.272	0.232
Mean DV (Control)	0.621	0.625	0.547	0.117	0.109	0.082	0.305	0.397
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	−1.000	−1.000	−1.000	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
distance + distance × discrepancy	-0.004	-0.065***	-0.249**	-0.021*	-0.107***	-0.344***	-0.382***	-0.446***
	(0.725)	(0.000)	(0.015)	(0.096)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.002)

Table 17: Hypothesis 2.b, continuous shock

	Pre-election	Post-election
distance	−0.001	−0.101
	(0.031)	(0.104)
registration or civics	−0.005	−0.039
	(0.030)	(0.107)
[registration or civics] × distance	−0.022	0.065
	(0.043)	(0.159)
Num.Obs.	7033	698
R2	0.033	0.187
Mean DV (Control)	1.262	1.206
Min. DV	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	3.000	3.000

Table 18: Hypothesis 3.a

	Abs. pref			Rel. pref			Vote for fav.	
	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_1	t_2	t_3	Sharp	Imputed
distance	0.001	0.007	0.142*	−0.003	0.008	0.168	0.087	0.092
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.076)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.103)	(0.112)	(0.123)
registration or civics	0.006	0.012	0.122*	0.004	0.008	0.160*	0.096	0.099
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.065)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.101)
discrepancy	0.007	−0.011	0.236***	0.015	−0.012	0.240***	0.212**	0.226**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.060)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.094)
distance × discrepancy	−0.003	−0.025*	−0.278***	−0.014	−0.028*	−0.251**	−0.258*	−0.207
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.093)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.123)	(0.135)	(0.150)
[registration or civics] × distance	0.009	−0.002	−0.157	0.015	−0.005	−0.223	−0.216	−0.146
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.107)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.165)
[registration or civics] × discrepancy	−0.010	−0.002	−0.235***	−0.021*	−0.004	−0.230**	−0.188	−0.171
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.084)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.112)	(0.121)	(0.134)
[registration or civics] × distance × discrepancy	0.001	−0.011	0.227*	−0.003	−0.008	0.203	0.288	0.070
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.129)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.175)	(0.179)	(0.202)
prior	−0.072***	−0.064***	0.085	0.754***	0.682***	0.327***	0.022	0.052
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.068)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.106)
Num.Obs.	6942	6932	649	6884	6864	637	561	561
R2	0.750	0.634	0.237	0.581	0.439	0.204	0.269	0.224
Mean DV (Control)	0.621	0.625	0.547	0.117	0.109	0.082	0.305	0.397
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	−1.000	−1.000	−1.000	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
distance + distance × discrepancy	-0.003	-0.018**	-0.136***	-0.017**	-0.020**	-0.083	-0.171**	-0.115
	(0.645)	(0.029)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.207)	(0.023)	(0.158)
[registration or civics] × distance + [registration or civics] × distance × discrepancy	0.009	-0.014	0.070	0.012	-0.014	-0.020	0.071	-0.077
	(0.339)	(0.269)	(0.352)	(0.275)	(0.327)	(0.837)	(0.495)	(0.498)

Table 19: Hypothesis 3.b, discrete shock

	Abs. pref			Rel. pref			Vote for fav.	
	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_1	t_2	t_3	Sharp	Imputed
distance	−0.002	−0.010	−0.043	−0.012**	−0.012	−0.003	−0.097	−0.054
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.043)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.066)
registration or civics	−0.001	0.010*	−0.024	−0.010	0.006	0.022	−0.031	−0.012
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.042)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.065)
discrepancy	0.010	−0.003	0.236***	0.015	−0.010	0.307***	0.347***	0.383***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.084)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.088)	(0.120)	(0.126)
distance × discrepancy	−0.001	−0.047***	−0.233*	−0.016	−0.083***	−0.326**	−0.357**	−0.402**
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.128)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.163)	(0.180)	(0.196)
[registration or civics] × distance	0.009	−0.008	−0.014	0.014	−0.009	−0.100	−0.016	−0.101
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.062)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.091)
[registration or civics] × discrepancy	−0.014	−0.008	−0.079	−0.026	−0.008	0.003	−0.199	−0.071
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.127)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.160)	(0.169)	(0.181)
[registration or civics] × distance × discrepancy	−0.011	−0.008	0.077	0.001	−0.016	0.081	0.172	0.117
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.186)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.246)	(0.249)	(0.271)
prior	−0.072***	−0.063***	0.092	0.754***	0.685***	0.333***	0.027	0.062
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.068)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.105)
Num.Obs.	6942	6932	649	6884	6864	637	561	561
R2	0.750	0.634	0.229	0.581	0.444	0.214	0.275	0.237
Mean DV (Control)	0.621	0.625	0.547	0.117	0.109	0.082	0.305	0.397
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	−1.000	−1.000	−1.000	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

Table 20: Hypothesis 3.b, continuous shock

	Pre-election	Post-election
distance	0.008	0.116
	(0.044)	(0.147)
late	−0.030	0.123
	(0.042)	(0.152)
distance × late	−0.013	−0.115
	(0.059)	(0.255)
Num.Obs.	3685	259
R2	0.013	0.055
Mean DV (Control)	1.253	1.138
Min. DV	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	3.000	3.000

Table 21: Hypothesis 4.a

	Abs. pref			Rel. pref			Vote for fav.	
	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_1	t_2	t_3	Sharp	Imputed
distance	0.010	0.017	0.019	0.010	0.005	0.013	0.078	−0.036
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.104)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.152)	(0.129)	(0.148)
discrepancy	0.001	−0.014	0.151*	0.005	−0.026*	0.173	0.101	0.079
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.080)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.110)	(0.115)	(0.127)
distance × discrepancy	−0.017	−0.044**	−0.200	−0.033*	−0.021	−0.210	−0.201	−0.123
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.124)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.169)	(0.163)	(0.182)
prior	−0.050***	−0.030*	0.053	0.767***	0.699***	0.246*	0.120	0.167
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.102)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.140)	(0.131)	(0.155)
late	−0.005	0.002	−0.012	0.006	−0.007	0.011	0.033	−0.040
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.112)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.148)
distance × late	0.003	−0.002	0.104	−0.004	0.027	−0.014	−0.063	0.043
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.159)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.220)	(0.202)	(0.223)
late × discrepancy	0.011	0.009	−0.111	0.002	0.027	−0.215	−0.099	−0.048
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.136)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.161)	(0.173)	(0.194)
distance × late × discrepancy	0.002	−0.018	−0.076	0.015	−0.050	0.108	0.164	0.035
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.197)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.264)	(0.244)	(0.272)
Num.Obs.	3656	3650	246	3626	3612	240	215	215
R2	0.732	0.609	0.164	0.575	0.424	0.160	0.116	0.122
Mean DV (Control)	0.654	0.654	0.583	0.131	0.117	0.121	0.235	0.373
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	−1.000	−1.000	−1.000	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
distance + distance × discrepancy	-0.007	-0.027**	-0.182***	-0.023**	-0.017	-0.197**	-0.123	-0.159
	(0.463)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.042)	(0.213)	(0.010)	(0.206)	(0.126)
distance × late + distance × late × discrepancy	0.005	-0.019	0.028	0.011	-0.023	0.094	0.101	0.078
	(0.697)	(0.268)	(0.822)	(0.456)	(0.228)	(0.536)	(0.511)	(0.646)

Table 22: Hypothesis 4.b, discrete shock

	Abs. pref			Rel. pref			Vote for fav.	
	t_1	t_2	t_3	t_1	t_2	t_3	Sharp	Imputed
distance	−0.001	−0.010	−0.113**	−0.011	−0.009	−0.125*	−0.060	−0.118
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.056)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.084)
discrepancy	0.013	−0.016	0.253*	0.010	−0.015	0.392***	0.115	0.178
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.129)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.133)	(0.161)	(0.173)
distance × discrepancy	−0.014	−0.042*	−0.159	−0.046*	−0.089***	−0.274	−0.242	−0.190
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.173)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.190)	(0.207)	(0.231)
prior	−0.050***	−0.029*	0.070	0.768***	0.701***	0.240	0.159	0.189
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.106)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.150)	(0.131)	(0.154)
late	0.002	0.008	−0.069	0.007	0.011	−0.090	−0.011	−0.024
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.061)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.074)	(0.093)	(0.104)
distance × late	0.003	−0.017	0.021	0.005	−0.010	0.034	−0.001	−0.014
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.104)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.147)
late × discrepancy	0.008	0.028	−0.059	−0.008	0.020	−0.079	0.081	0.216
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.181)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.213)	(0.250)	(0.289)
distance × late × discrepancy	−0.028	−0.058	−0.230	0.022	−0.069	0.014	−0.138	−0.414
	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.274)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.349)	(0.344)	(0.386)
Num.Obs.	3656	3650	246	3626	3612	240	215	215
R2	0.732	0.608	0.164	0.575	0.432	0.183	0.120	0.139
Mean DV (Control)	0.654	0.654	0.583	0.131	0.117	0.121	0.235	0.373
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	−1.000	−1.000	−1.000	0.000	0.000
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

Table 23: Hypothesis 4.b, continuous shock

	Pre-election			Post-election						
	GOTV	Redirect	Donate	MP Rep.	Instit. action	Noninstit. action	Efficacy	Interest	News	Donate
registration	−0.028*	−0.022	−0.004	0.042	−0.003	−0.052	−0.034	0.002	−0.027	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.033)
civics	0.024*	0.007	−0.005	0.054	−0.012	−0.038	0.033	0.015	−0.014	0.022
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.045)	(0.076)	(0.063)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.043)
distance	−0.008	−0.013	0.008	0.017	−0.035	−0.012	0.032	−0.005	0.005	0.049**
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.025)
Num.Obs.	7648	7648	7493	608	651	651	652	713	701	696
R2	0.114	0.055	0.023	0.236	0.237	0.217	0.207	0.279	0.178	0.232
Mean DV (Control)	0.706	0.460	0.070	0.430	0.476	0.268	0.531	0.520	0.015	0.084
Min. DV	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	−0.555	0.000
Max. DV	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.445	1.000

Table 24: Hypothesis 5. The pre-registered "Share" outcome is omitted because it was mismeasured.

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